Hyperpolymath Boj — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@hyperpolymath/boj-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@hyperpolymath/boj-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@hyperpolymath/boj-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp-bridge/lib/security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp-bridge/lib/security.js:49`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp-bridge/lib/security.js"
},
"evidence": "string only — not a JS eval() call; Hypatia js_eval finding is a false positive \"exec(\", ]; /** * Normalize a strin",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "mcp-bridge/lib/security.js",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-bridge/lib/nickel-validator.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp-bridge/lib/nickel-validator.js:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp-bridge/lib/nickel-validator.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"node:url\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp-bridge/lib/nickel-validator.js",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-bridge/lib/security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp-bridge/lib/security.js:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp-bridge/lib/security.js"
},
"evidence": "is a false positive \"exec(\", ]; /** * Normalize a string for injection analysis. * Strips zero-width characters, n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp-bridge/lib/security.js",
"line": 50,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (cartridges/docker-hub-mcp/mod.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cartridges/docker-hub-mcp/mod.js:278`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cartridges/docker-hub-mcp/mod.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/ratelimitpreview/test/manifests/latest\", { method",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "cartridges/docker-hub-mcp/mod.js",
"line": 278,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (mcp-bridge/lib/api-clients.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp-bridge/lib/api-clients.js:188`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp-bridge/lib/api-clients.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const res = await fetch(\"https://api.github.com/graphql\", { method: \"POST\", headers: { \"Author",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "mcp-bridge/lib/api-clients.js",
"line": 188,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (elixir/priv/js_pool_worker.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elixir/priv/js_pool_worker.js:39`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elixir/priv/js_pool_worker.js"
},
"evidence": "const imported = await import(modUrl); handleTool = imported.handleTool; modCache.set(mod, handleTool);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "elixir/priv/js_pool_worker.js",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (elixir/priv/js_runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`elixir/priv/js_runner.js:42`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "elixir/priv/js_runner.js"
},
"evidence": "y { const mod = await import(modUrl); if (typeof mod.handleTool !== \"function\") { console.error(JSON.stringify(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "elixir/priv/js_runner.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search_zotero",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_paper_metadata",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "generate_citation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_bibkeys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_review_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_graph_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_proof",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_proven_theorems",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "type_check_expression",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_proof",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_theorem",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "map_extension",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_mapped_extensions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_extension_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_extension",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_extensions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dns_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dns_reverse_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dns_bulk_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lint_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_deviations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_snippet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_syntax",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "2cdde22e7835b11dc7ec056ac9b832e1f70ba357661ed02f51d48ccfee1a1f2f",
"stats": {
"tools": 30,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 4,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}