Humanpages MCP Server
humanpages
npm
v1.4.6
Published by human-pages-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server (+ OpenClaw SKILL.md) that gives AI agents access to real-world people who listed themselves to be hired by agents. 31 tools including search by skill/location/equipment, job offers, job board listings, in-job messaging, streaming payments, and
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([search_humans, create_listing, get_listings, list_arbitrators]) co-exist with external-action tools ([register_agent, create_job_offer, register_as_arbitrator]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [search_humans, create_listing, get_listings, list_arbitrators] → sinks [register_agent, create_job_offer, register_as_arbitrator]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow search_humans → register_agent
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "website_url" on "register_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "website_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_agent · inputSchema.properties.website_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "register_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_agent · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "register_as_arbitrator"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_as_arbitrator" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_as_arbitrator · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_job_offernetwork egresscreate_listingingests untrusted inputget_listingsingests untrusted inputlist_arbitratorsingests untrusted inputregister_agentnetwork egressregister_as_arbitratornetwork egresssearch_humansingests untrusted inputapprove_completionno sensitive capabilitycancel_listingno sensitive capabilitycheck_humanity_statusno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
claim_free_pro_upgradeno sensitive capabilityget_activation_statusno sensitive capabilityget_agent_profileno sensitive capabilityget_dispute_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_funding_infono sensitive capabilityget_humanno sensitive capabilityget_human_profileno sensitive capabilityget_job_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_job_statusno sensitive capabilityget_listingno sensitive capabilityget_listing_applicationsno sensitive capabilityget_payment_activationno sensitive capabilityget_promo_statusno sensitive capabilityget_wallet_nonceno sensitive capabilityleave_reviewno sensitive capabilitymake_listing_offerno sensitive capabilitymark_job_paidno sensitive capabilitypause_streamno sensitive capabilityrecord_stream_tickno sensitive capabilityrequest_activation_codeno sensitive capabilityrequest_revisionno sensitive capabilityresume_streamno sensitive capabilitysend_job_messageno sensitive capabilityset_walletno sensitive capabilitystart_streamno sensitive capabilitystop_streamno sensitive capabilitysubmit_verdictno sensitive capabilityverify_agent_domainno sensitive capabilityverify_payment_activationno sensitive capabilityverify_social_activationno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.6 latest |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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