Humanaizer MCP Server

humanaizer-mcp npm v0.2.1

Published by destakesk — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Humanaizer MCP server — end-to-end AI content generation (login, plan/quota, autopilot pipeline, publish) from Claude.

View on npm ↗ Repository ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

92/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 92/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 99 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−1.2	Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code MTC-SRC-008	exfiltration

2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 2

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto"; import * as fs from

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-008

A hardcoded JSON Web Token (a public-by-design (anon/publishable) key — RLS, not secrecy, protects it) appears in `dist/index.js:54`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server dist/index.js

Tools 18

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

create_contentno sensitive capability
get_accountno sensitive capability
get_contentno sensitive capability
get_content_statusno sensitive capability
get_content_type_schemano sensitive capability
get_quality_scoreno sensitive capability
list_brand_kitsno sensitive capability
list_content_typesno sensitive capability
list_contentsno sensitive capability
list_integrationsno sensitive capability

Show 8 more tools ↓

list_prompt_templatesno sensitive capability
list_publish_jobsno sensitive capability
loginno sensitive capability
login_browserno sensitive capability
login_statusno sensitive capability
logoutno sensitive capability
publish_contentno sensitive capability
retry_outlineno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v0.2.1` latest	A 92/100	2	1.13.0	2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan humanaizer-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works