Hugging Face MCP Server
https://huggingface.co/mcp
Remote
v0.3.35
Published by huggingface.co — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Search Hugging Face models, datasets, Spaces, and docs; anonymous users get a standard Hub toolset.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Annotation contradicts behavior on "hf_fs" MTC-CAP-003 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "hf_fs" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "hf_fs" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool hf_fs
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([hf_fs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([hf_fs]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [hf_fs] → sinks [hf_fs]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow hf_fs → hf_fs
medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "hf_fs"MTC-CAP-003
Tool "hf_fs" advertises readOnlyHint=true but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (untrusted-input, code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.
Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.
Location: tool hf_fs
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
hf_fsingests untrusted inputruns code / shellhf_whoamino sensitive capabilityhub_repo_detailsno sensitive capabilityhub_repo_searchno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.35 latest |
B 88/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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