Hubspot (npm) MCP Server
hubspot-mcp-server
npm
v0.2.17
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A powerful Model Context Protocol (MCP) server implementation for seamless HubSpot CRM integration, enabling AI assistants to interact with your HubSpot data
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/hubspot-client.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/hubspot-client.js:870`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`https://api.hubapi.com/oauth/v1/access-tokens/${this.accessToken}`); if (!res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hubspot-client.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/token-manager.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/token-manager.js:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.hubapi.com/oauth/v1/token', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/token-manager.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/hubspot-client.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/hubspot-client.ts:1079`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`https://api.hubapi.com/oauth/v1/access-tokens/${this.accessToken}`); if (!resp.o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/hubspot-client.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/token-manager.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/token-manager.ts:92`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.hubapi.com/oauth/v1/token', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/token-manager.ts
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
hubspot_create_companyno sensitive capabilityhubspot_create_contactno sensitive capabilityhubspot_create_noteno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_active_companiesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_active_contactsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_analyticsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_associationsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_blog_postsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_campaignsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_company_activityno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
hubspot_get_company_by_idno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_contact_by_idno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_conversationsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_current_userno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_custom_objectsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_deal_by_idno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_dealsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_domainsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_email_eventsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_engagement_associationsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_engagement_by_idno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_filesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_form_submissionsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_formsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_hubdb_tablesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_knowledge_baseno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_landing_pagesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_line_itemsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_listsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_marketing_emailsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_ordersno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_pipelinesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_productsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_propertiesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_quotesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_recent_engagementsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_site_pagesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_ticket_by_idno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_ticketsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_usersno sensitive capabilityhubspot_get_workflowsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_refresh_tokenno sensitive capabilityhubspot_search_notesno sensitive capabilityhubspot_search_objectsno sensitive capabilityhubspot_search_tasksno sensitive capabilityhubspot_token_healthno sensitive capabilityhubspot_update_companyno sensitive capabilityhubspot_update_contactno sensitive capabilityhubspot_validate_tokenno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.17 latest |
A 95/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan hubspot-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Hubspot 18
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 19 side by side →
MCP Server for developers building HubSpot Apps
HubSpot MCP server — CRM objects, associations, properties, marketing, files, workflows, and account diagnostics
Hubspot MCP - An extensive MCP server for the HubSpot API
HubSpot MCP server for AI assistants like Claude: contacts, deals, pipelines, owners, custom objects, engagements, and CRM automation. Built by Nubiia.
HubSpot MCP server for CRM operations
Hubspot MCP Server - A server implementation for HubSpot integration using Model Context Protocol
More in Marketing & Social
Official Abyssfall game info, newsletter double opt-in, and merch reservation tools.
AdCritter ads platform: docs, API reference, app scaffolding, and white-label integration.
Google AdSense MCP Server - Monitor earnings, reports, and account health via Claude/AI
Operational empathy for technical founders + PE/VC operators navigating high-stakes B2B interactions. 28 MCP tools + CLI: ICP scoring, persona simulation, battlecards, deal classification, prospect discovery, investor matching, founder wellness, plus mark
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools — SEO site management, URL submission, sitemaps, stats, keywords
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that helps AI agents use Primer Brand (@primer/react-brand) correctly when building GitHub marketing and landing pages.