X402 Mcp Bridge MCP Server
@hpp-io/x402-mcp-bridge
npm
v0.1.18
Source verified
Published by hpp-io — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP stdio bridge that lets Claude Desktop / OpenClaw / other MCP hosts make x402 payments on HPP — autoTopup from a Safe via AllowanceModule, signs EIP-3009 with a delegate EOA.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/install-claude-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/install-claude-code.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; const ENTRY_NAME = "hpp-x402"; const PKG = "@hpp-io/x402-mcp-bridge"; /** * Bui
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/install-claude-code.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/hpp-x402.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/hpp-x402.js:433`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ]; const m = (await import(modPath)); await m.run(); } const PASSTHROUGH = { policy: { mod: "./policy.js", l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/hpp-x402.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@hpp-io/x402-mcp-bridge" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: patch-package || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @hpp-io/x402-mcp-bridge
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wallet_addressno sensitive capabilitywallet_balanceno sensitive capabilitywallet_get_limitsno sensitive capabilitywallet_set_limitno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.18 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.1.14 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.1.13 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.1.9 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @hpp-io/x402-mcp-bridge --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.