Hot Memory MCP Server
hot-memory-mcp
PyPI
v0.8.0
Published by michael-denyer — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Engram-inspired memory MCP server with hot cache and pattern mining
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/memory_mcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/memory_mcp/cli.py:209`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["tail", "-200", transcript_path], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/memory_mcp/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/memory_mcp/project.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/memory_mcp/project.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git"] + args, capture_output=True, text=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/memory_mcp/project.py
medium Tool "unlink_memories" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_memories" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_memories
low Mutating tool "unlink_memories" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_memories" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_memories
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:229`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nly the detached mining spawn (subprocess.run's `tail` call still delegates to the real Popen). """
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_hook.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_hook.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } result = subprocess.run( ["bash", str(HOOK_SCRIPT)], input=json.dumps({"transcrip
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_hook.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_project.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_project.py:106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a git repo subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=tmpdir, capture_output=True) subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_project.py
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
unlink_memorieswrites filesaccess_patternsno sensitive capabilityapprove_candidateno sensitive capabilityaudit_historyno sensitive capabilitybootstrap_projectno sensitive capabilitybulk_reject_candidatesno sensitive capabilitycross_session_patternsno sensitive capabilitydb_infono sensitive capabilitydb_maintenanceno sensitive capabilitydb_rebuild_vectorsno sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
demoteno sensitive capabilityembedding_infono sensitive capabilityend_sessionno sensitive capabilityfind_contradictionsno sensitive capabilityforgetno sensitive capabilityget_contradictionsno sensitive capabilityget_related_memoriesno sensitive capabilityget_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_session_memoriesno sensitive capabilityget_sessionsno sensitive capabilityget_trust_historyno sensitive capabilityhot_cache_statusno sensitive capabilityinvalidate_memoryno sensitive capabilitylink_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylog_outputno sensitive capabilitymark_contradictionno sensitive capabilitymark_memory_usedno sensitive capabilitymemory_statsno sensitive capabilitymetrics_statusno sensitive capabilitymining_statusno sensitive capabilitypinno sensitive capabilitypredict_nextno sensitive capabilitypredictive_cache_statusno sensitive capabilitypreview_consolidationno sensitive capabilitypromoteno sensitive capabilityrecallno sensitive capabilityrecall_by_tagno sensitive capabilityrecall_with_fallbackno sensitive capabilityreject_candidateno sensitive capabilityrelationship_statsno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityresolve_contradictionno sensitive capabilityretrieval_quality_statsno sensitive capabilityreview_candidatesno sensitive capabilityrun_cleanupno sensitive capabilityrun_consolidationno sensitive capabilityrun_miningno sensitive capabilityseed_from_fileno sensitive capabilityseed_from_textno sensitive capabilityset_session_topicno sensitive capabilitysummarize_sessionno sensitive capabilityunpinno sensitive capabilityvalidate_embeddingsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_memoryno sensitive capabilitywarm_cacheno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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