Hostinger Api MCP Server
hostinger-api-mcp
npm
v1.57.0
Source verified
Published by hostinger — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Hostinger API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (skills/headless/entry/bootstrap.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`skills/headless/entry/bootstrap.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server skills/headless/entry/bootstrap.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/oauth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/oauth.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; import path from "path"; import os from "os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/oauth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/oauth.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/oauth.ts:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import path from 'path'; import os from 'os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/oauth.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.57.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.55.1 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.52.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v1.51.1 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v1.48.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.46.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.45.5 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v1.45.4 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v1.44.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v1.42.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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