Hopx MCP Server
hopx-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP tool for executing code in isolated environments using HopX
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([file_read, env_get]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_code, execute_code_persistent, execute_code_rich, execute_code_background, execute_code_isolated, run_command, run_command_background]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [file_read, env_get] → sinks [execute_code, execute_code_persistent, execute_code_rich, execute_code_background, execute_code_isolated, run_command, run
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow file_read → execute_code
high Tool "execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code
high Tool "execute_code_persistent" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code_persistent" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code_persistent
high Tool "execute_code_rich" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code_rich" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code_rich
high Tool "execute_code_background" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code_background" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code_background
high Tool "execute_code_isolated" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code_isolated" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code_isolated
high Tool "run_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_command
high Tool "run_command_background" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_command_background" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_command_background
high Shell/command execution in server code (hopx_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`hopx_mcp/server.py:1660`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: de(sandbox_id=id, code="exec(open('/workspace/script.py').read())") Example: file_write( sandbo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hopx_mcp/server.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (hopx_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`hopx_mcp/server.py:2151`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort requests response = requests.get("https://api.github.com") print(f"Status: {response.status_code}") print(response.j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hopx_mcp/server.py
low Mutating tool "execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code
low Mutating tool "execute_code_persistent" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code_persistent" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code_persistent
low Mutating tool "execute_code_rich" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code_rich" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code_rich
low Mutating tool "execute_code_background" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code_background" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code_background
low Mutating tool "execute_code_isolated" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code_isolated" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code_isolated
low Mutating tool "run_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_command
low Mutating tool "run_command_background" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_command_background" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_command_background
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
env_getreads sensitive dataexecute_coderuns code / shellexecute_code_backgroundruns code / shellexecute_code_isolatedruns code / shellexecute_code_persistentruns code / shellexecute_code_richruns code / shellfile_readreads sensitive datarun_commandruns code / shellrun_command_backgroundruns code / shellcache_clearno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
cache_statsno sensitive capabilitycreate_sandboxno sensitive capabilitydelete_sandboxno sensitive capabilityenv_clearno sensitive capabilityenv_setno sensitive capabilityexecute_kill_processno sensitive capabilityexecute_list_processesno sensitive capabilityfile_existsno sensitive capabilityfile_listno sensitive capabilityfile_mkdirno sensitive capabilityfile_removeno sensitive capabilityfile_writeno sensitive capabilityget_agent_urlno sensitive capabilityget_preview_urlno sensitive capabilityget_sandboxno sensitive capabilityget_system_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilityget_vm_infono sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_sandboxesno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilityping_vmno sensitive capabilityresume_sandboxno sensitive capabilityupdate_sandbox_timeoutno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 17 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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