Hkopenai Hk Climate MCP Server
hkopenai-hk-climate-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.4.1
Published by hkopenai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Hong Kong Weather MCP Server providing climate and weather data tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/astronomical.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/astronomical.py:27`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tr(day) response = requests.get( 'https://data.weather.gov.hk/weatherAPI/opendata/opendata.php', pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/astronomical.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/radiation.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/radiation.py:163`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( 'https://data.weather.gov.hk/weatherAPI/opendata/opendata.php',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/radiation.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/temperature.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/temperature.py:31`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (month) response = requests.get( 'https://data.weather.gov.hk/weatherAPI/opendata/opendata.php', pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/temperature.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/tides.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/tides.py:89`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(hour) response = requests.get( 'https://data.weather.gov.hk/weatherAPI/opendata/opendata.php', pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hkopenai/hk_climate_mcp_server/tools/tides.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_client_simulation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_client_simulation.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self.server_process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "hkopenai.hk_climate_mcp_server", "--sse"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_client_simulation.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_temperature_live.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_temperature_live.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: gs)}") result = subprocess.run(pytest_args, text=True, capture_output=True) print(result.stdout)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_temperature_live.py
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_9_day_weather_forecastno sensitive capabilityget_current_weatherno sensitive capabilityget_daily_max_temperatureno sensitive capabilityget_daily_mean_temperatureno sensitive capabilityget_daily_min_temperatureno sensitive capabilityget_gregorian_lunar_calendarno sensitive capabilityget_high_low_tidesno sensitive capabilityget_hourly_tidesno sensitive capabilityget_lightning_datano sensitive capabilityget_local_weather_forecastno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
get_moon_timesno sensitive capabilityget_radiation_station_codesno sensitive capabilityget_special_weather_tipsno sensitive capabilityget_sunrise_sunset_timesno sensitive capabilityget_tide_station_codesno sensitive capabilityget_visibility_datano sensitive capabilityget_weather_radiation_reportno sensitive capabilityget_weather_warning_infono sensitive capabilityget_weather_warning_summaryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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