Hivelore MCP Server
@hivelore/mcp
npm
v0.62.0
Published by @hivelore — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Hivelore MCP server - policy-aware briefing and memory tools for coding-agent harnesses
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4459`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: de-version" || base === ".npmrc" || base === ".yarnrc" || base === ".yarnrc.yml" || base === ".dockerignore" || base ===
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:4465`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: de-version" || base === ".npmrc" || base === ".yarnrc" || base === ".yarnrc.yml" || base === ".dockerignore" || base ===
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1165`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { readFile as readFile3, writeFile as writeFile8 } from "fs/promises"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:1163`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { readFile as readFile3, writeFile as writeFile8 } from "fs/promises"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.62.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.61.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.58.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.57.6 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.57.5 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.57.4 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v0.57.3 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.54.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.53.2 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.53.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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