Hive Intelligence MCP Server

In the server's implementation (`build/chunk-BDO27NIP.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { platform } from "os"; var CLI_EXCHANGE_PATH = "/auth/cli/exchange"; var

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/chunk-BDO27NIP.js

In the server's implementation (`build/chunk-GB4XMTDE.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { readdirSync, rmSync, existsSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/chunk-GB4XMTDE.js

In the server's implementation (`build/chunk-QDZ7MAVN.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; var DEFAULT_URL = "https://mcp.hiveintelligence.xyz"; var SERVER_NAME = "hive";

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/chunk-QDZ7MAVN.js

In the server's implementation (`build/cli.js:182`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: port childProcess from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; import process2 from "process"; im

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/cli.js

In the server's implementation (`build/completion-L3TDZ7ZK.js:257`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eSync } = await import("child_process"); const bin = process.argv[1] ?? PRIMARY_COMMAND; const output = exec

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/completion-L3TDZ7ZK.js

In the server's implementation (`build/open-V2RNA3QT.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: s import { exec } from "child_process"; import { platform } from "os"; var URLS = { dashboard: "https://www.hiveintell

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/open-V2RNA3QT.js

In the server's implementation (`build/chunk-M6REON2I.js:46`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ; const res = await fetch( `https://registry.npmjs.org/${REGISTRY_PACKAGE}/latest`, { signal: controller

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/chunk-M6REON2I.js

In the server's implementation (`build/open-V2RNA3QT.js:15`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: "start" : "xdg-open"; exec(`${cmd} ${url}`, (err) => { if (err) process.stderr.write(`Open this URL manually: ${ur

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/open-V2RNA3QT.js

In the server's implementation (`bin/hive-mcp.js:33`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ocess.exit(1); } await import(cliPath);

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/hive-mcp.js