Hermes Grocy MCP Server
hermes-grocy-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Grocy household ERP inventory and shopping workflows
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/live_readonly_test.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/live_readonly_test.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rgs}}, ] proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "grocy_mcp"], cwd=ROOT, stdin=s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/live_readonly_test.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_protocol.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_protocol.py:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: grocy.info") proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "grocy_mcp"], cwd=ROOT, stdin=s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_protocol.py
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
grocy_add_product_to_shopping_listno sensitive capabilitygrocy_add_stockno sensitive capabilitygrocy_common_entitiesno sensitive capabilitygrocy_consume_stockno sensitive capabilitygrocy_create_entity_objectno sensitive capabilitygrocy_get_entity_objectno sensitive capabilitygrocy_get_productno sensitive capabilitygrocy_inventory_productno sensitive capabilitygrocy_list_entityno sensitive capabilitygrocy_list_productsno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
grocy_list_shopping_list_itemsno sensitive capabilitygrocy_list_shopping_listsno sensitive capabilitygrocy_lookup_product_by_barcodeno sensitive capabilitygrocy_product_stock_detailsno sensitive capabilitygrocy_product_stock_entriesno sensitive capabilitygrocy_remove_product_from_shopping_listno sensitive capabilitygrocy_search_productsno sensitive capabilitygrocy_stock_overviewno sensitive capabilitygrocy_system_infono sensitive capabilitygrocy_update_entity_objectno sensitive capabilitygrocy_volatile_stockno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan hermes-grocy-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Lifestyle & Local
MCP server for Australian address search and validation via Addressr
Admissions data & match scores for law, medical, dental, MBA, pharmacy, vet, optometry schools
Live AI data for agents: model releases, regulations (EU AI Act), GenAI glossary, daily news.
AirTreks MCP Server — complex flight routing intelligence for AI agents. Plan multi-city trips, validate alliance routings, get carrier recommendations, and create trip ideas.
Physician-reviewed medical opinions and prescriptions for AI agents.
Thin MCP server + CLI that proxy the atrium /api/v1 observability surface using an oc_live_ Bearer key. Talks HTTP only — no Convex imports.