Subagent (heretyc) MCP Server
@heretyc/subagent-mcp
npm
v3.2.3
Source verified
Published by heretyc — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server that launches Claude Code/Codex sub-agents and routes tasks to Claude Messages or OpenAI-compatible API providers.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; import { realpathSync } from "node:f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hooks/statusline-claude.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/hooks/statusline-claude.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url"; import { realpathSync } from "node:fs"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hooks/statusline-claude.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync, execSync } from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; import { unlinkSync, existsSync, rea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/install-mode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/install-mode.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/install-mode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/orchestration/model-mode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/orchestration/model-mode.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } from "node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/orchestration/model-mode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/orchestration/update-check.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/orchestration/update-check.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { fi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/orchestration/update-check.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ruleset.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ruleset.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ruleset.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/upgrade.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/upgrade.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createBackup } from "./backup.js"; import { detectInstallMode } from ".
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/upgrade.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/zombie.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/zombie.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; export const ZOMBIE_LIVE_IDLE_MS = 6 * 60 * 1000; export const ZOMBIE_TERMINAL_I
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/zombie.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { stateDir } from "./orchestration/marker.js"; import { CODEX_AUTOCOMPACT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@heretyc/subagent-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @heretyc/subagent-mcp
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
send_messagenetwork egress__test_park_yolo_wait_permissionno sensitive capabilityconfigureno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityhandoff-clearno sensitive capabilityhandoff-readno sensitive capabilityhandoff-writeno sensitive capabilitykill_agentno sensitive capabilitylaunch_agentno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
model-selection-modeno sensitive capabilityorchestration-modeno sensitive capabilitypoll_agentno sensitive capabilityrespond_permissionno sensitive capabilityswarmno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.2.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.2.2 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v3.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v3.1.7 |
A 94/100 | 11 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
v3.1.6 |
F 52/100 | 12 | 1.3.1 | 2026-07-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @heretyc/subagent-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Subagent 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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