Chrome Bridge (helmisatria) MCP Server
@helmisatria/mcp-chrome-bridge
npm
v1.0.32
Published by @helmisatria — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Chrome Native-Messaging host (Node)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/directory-picker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/directory-picker.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: kdialog */ const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_util_1 = require("node:util"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/directory-picker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/engines/codex.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/codex.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ne = void 0; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_readline_1 = __importDefault(require
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/engines/codex.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/open-project.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/open-project.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /promises"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const project_service_1 = require("./project-se
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/open-project.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/agent/engines/claude.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/claude.js:68`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n('moduleName', 'return import(moduleName)')(sdkModuleName); query = sdk.query; } catch (err
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/engines/claude.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/browser-config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/browser-config.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const constant_1 = require("./constant"); var Browse
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/browser-config.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/build.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { value: true }); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs")); const p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/build.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/doctor.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const constant_1 = require("./constant"); const brow
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/doctor.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/report.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/report.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const constant_1 = require("./constant"); const brow
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/report.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/utils.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const constant_1 = r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/utils.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@helmisatria/mcp-chrome-bridge" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node dist/scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @helmisatria/mcp-chrome-bridge
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.32 latest |
A 91/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @helmisatria/mcp-chrome-bridge --onlineOther implementations of Chrome Bridge 6
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