Heista MCP Server

https://www.heista.co/api/mcp/mcp Remote v1.0.0

Published by heista.co — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Decode video ads, load brand intelligence, generate ad scripts.

Trust grade
B
88/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 88/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Live
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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B Why this grade threat 94 − adoption risk = 88/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Annotation contradicts behavior on "generate_adscript" MTC-CAP-003 permissions

2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 8

high Tool "generate_adscript" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "generate_adscript" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool generate_adscript

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([decode_ad, get_decode, get_powersource, get_hook_intelligence, adformula_intelligence, decoder_intelligence, perplexity_search, fetch_url, get_saved_asset, get_saved_assets_batch, fleet_gsc_inspect_url, fleet_gsc_sitemaps, fleet_site_audit_summary, fleet_site_pages, fleet_seo_recovery]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_powersource_url, generate_adscript, fleet_create_issue]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [decode_ad, get_decode, get_powersource, get_hook_intelligence, adformula_intelligence, decoder_intelligence, perplexity_search, fetch_url, get_saved_

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow decode_ad → create_powersource_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "decode_ad"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "decode_ad" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool decode_ad · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_powersource_url"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_powersource_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_powersource_url · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "create_powersource_url"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_powersource_url" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_powersource_url · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "fetch_url"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "fetch_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool fetch_url · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "fleet_gsc_inspect_url"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "fleet_gsc_inspect_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool fleet_gsc_inspect_url · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "generate_adscript"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "generate_adscript" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool generate_adscript

Tools 118

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

  • adformula_intelligenceingests untrusted input
  • create_powersource_urlnetwork egress
  • decode_adingests untrusted input
  • decoder_intelligenceingests untrusted input
  • fetch_urlingests untrusted input
  • fleet_create_issuenetwork egress
  • fleet_gsc_inspect_urlingests untrusted input
  • fleet_gsc_sitemapsingests untrusted input
  • fleet_seo_recoveryingests untrusted input
  • fleet_site_audit_summaryingests untrusted input
Show 108 more tools ↓
  • fleet_site_pagesingests untrusted input
  • generate_adscriptruns code / shell
  • get_decodeingests untrusted input
  • get_hook_intelligenceingests untrusted input
  • get_powersourceingests untrusted input
  • get_saved_assetingests untrusted input
  • get_saved_assets_batchingests untrusted input
  • perplexity_searchingests untrusted input
  • add_brand_assetno sensitive capability
  • call_creative_agent_presetno sensitive capability
  • call_creative_worldsno sensitive capability
  • chat_with_creative_worldsno sensitive capability
  • check_balanceno sensitive capability
  • create_powersource_docsno sensitive capability
  • create_powersource_fullno sensitive capability
  • creative_delete_draftno sensitive capability
  • creative_get_authoring_contractno sensitive capability
  • creative_get_draftno sensitive capability
  • creative_get_shelfno sensitive capability
  • creative_list_articlesno sensitive capability
  • creative_publish_articleno sensitive capability
  • creative_save_draftno sensitive capability
  • creative_unpublish_articleno sensitive capability
  • creative_update_slugno sensitive capability
  • delete_brand_assetno sensitive capability
  • delete_saved_assetno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_desk_researcherno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_desk_researcher_asyncno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_head_of_researchno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_market_analystno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_market_analyst_asyncno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_qualitative_researcherno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_qualitative_researcher_asyncno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_quantitative_researcherno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_quantitative_researcher_asyncno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_social_listening_researcherno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_social_listening_researcher_asyncno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_trend_researcherno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_trend_researcher_asyncno sensitive capability
  • favorite_saved_assetno sensitive capability
  • fleet_analytics_overviewno sensitive capability
  • fleet_analytics_top_pagesno sensitive capability
  • fleet_analytics_trendno sensitive capability
  • fleet_crawler_hitsno sensitive capability
  • fleet_get_brand_reportno sensitive capability
  • fleet_get_decoded_adno sensitive capability
  • fleet_get_issueno sensitive capability
  • fleet_gsc_queryno sensitive capability
  • fleet_gsc_summaryno sensitive capability
  • fleet_gsc_top_pagesno sensitive capability
  • fleet_gsc_top_queriesno sensitive capability
  • fleet_intel_statsno sensitive capability
  • fleet_list_brand_reportsno sensitive capability
  • fleet_list_intelligence_articlesno sensitive capability
  • fleet_list_issuesno sensitive capability
  • fleet_product_funnel_countsno sensitive capability
  • fleet_product_funnel_summaryno sensitive capability
  • fleet_product_signups_recentno sensitive capability
  • fleet_product_user_summaryno sensitive capability
  • fleet_search_decoded_adsno sensitive capability
  • fleet_site_linksno sensitive capability
  • get_ad_formula_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_brandno sensitive capability
  • get_cd_card_bookmark_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_creative_agent_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_creative_agent_skill_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_creative_director_playbook_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_decoded_ad_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_dispatch_resultno sensitive capability
  • get_fleet_costno sensitive capability
  • get_image_ad_scan_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_outfit_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_saved_visual_idea_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_strategyno sensitive capability
  • get_talent_model_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_visual_preset_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_visual_style_presetno sensitive capability
  • list_ad_formula_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_brand_assetsno sensitive capability
  • list_brand_documentsno sensitive capability
  • list_brandsno sensitive capability
  • list_cd_card_bookmark_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_creative_agent_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_creative_agent_skill_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_creative_director_playbook_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_decoded_ad_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_image_ad_scan_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_outfit_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_saved_assetsno sensitive capability
  • list_saved_visual_idea_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_skillsno sensitive capability
  • list_strategiesno sensitive capability
  • list_strategy_audiencesno sensitive capability
  • list_strategy_tonesno sensitive capability
  • list_talent_model_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_visual_preset_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_visual_style_presetsno sensitive capability
  • load_skillno sensitive capability
  • load_skill_referenceno sensitive capability
  • read_brand_documentno sensitive capability
  • reclassify_brand_assetsno sensitive capability
  • retag_brand_assetno sensitive capability
  • save_assetno sensitive capability
  • searchno sensitive capability
  • search_communityno sensitive capability
  • search_researchno sensitive capability
  • search_skillsno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.0 latest B 88/100 8 1.13.0 2026-09-06

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MCP Trust Score: B · 88/100
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