React Brain MCP Server
@heart-it/react-brain
npm
v0.9.1
Source verified
Published by heart-it — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 0 = 100. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
✓ No adoption-risk deductions — minimal blast radius, verified enough, and fully inspected.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-bench.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-bench.mjs:78`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const res = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-typ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-bench.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-triage-bench.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-triage-bench.mjs:111`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; } const res = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-typ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-triage-bench.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/cli.mjs:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { dirname, resolve } from 'node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/cli.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/detect.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/detect.mjs:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { dirname, join, resolve, basen
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/detect.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/mcp-server.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/mcp-server.mjs:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { dirname, resolve } from 'node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/mcp-server.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-bench.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-bench.mjs:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; let _cl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-bench.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-briefing.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-briefing.mjs:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { dirname, join, resolve } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-briefing.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-review.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-review.mjs:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join, ext
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-review.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-triage-bench.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-triage-bench.mjs:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-triage-bench.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/react-brain-verify-diff.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/react-brain-verify-diff.mjs:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, join, rela
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/react-brain-verify-diff.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.1 latest |
A 100/100 | 10 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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