Haxaml — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "haxaml",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "haxaml"
},
"server": {
"name": "haxaml"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (haxaml/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`haxaml/cli.py:310`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "haxaml/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "return first = subprocess.run(upgrade_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if first.returncode == 0:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "haxaml/cli.py",
"line": 310,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (haxaml/mcp/lifecycle_helpers.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`haxaml/mcp/lifecycle_helpers.py:462`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "haxaml/mcp/lifecycle_helpers.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", str(project), \"status\", \"--porcelain\"], ca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "haxaml/mcp/lifecycle_helpers.py",
"line": 462,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (haxaml/mcp/tools_ops.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`haxaml/mcp/tools_ops.py:175`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "haxaml/mcp/tools_ops.py"
},
"evidence": ") primary = subprocess.run(upgrade_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if primary.returncode == 0:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "haxaml/mcp/tools_ops.py",
"line": 175,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"haxaml\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "haxaml"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "haxaml_benchmark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_validate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_about",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_guidance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_context_pack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_context_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_session_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_session_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_expect_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_upgrade",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_reconcile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_needs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_state_show",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_state_compact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "haxaml_prebuild",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c89bbd9204514e5cf37655303f7583d789365f23ac8e108ac5cc24d06f71ede9",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}