Projects MCP Server
@hasna/projects
npm
v1.1.0
Published by @hasna — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
High-level project management CLI, MCP server, SDK, and AI SDK agent loop for coding agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:756`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess = __require("child_process"); var path = __require("path"); var fs = __require("fs"); var process2 = __
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:7565`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s execFileSync2 } from "child_process"; import { existsSync as existsSync5, mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, writeFileSync } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/index.js:8286`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s execFileSync2 } from "child_process"; import { existsSync as existsSync4, mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, writeFileSync } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sdk/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk/index.js:404`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { closeSync, fstatSync, openSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { O_NO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sdk/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:16558`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dule ?? ((specifier) => import(specifier)) }; return { todos: configuredAuthority("todos", resolved), mement
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:9899`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d); const sdk = await import(LOOPS_SDK_SPECIFIER); if (typeof sdk.loops !== "function") throw new Error("@hasna/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/mcp/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/index.js:13106`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d); const sdk = await import(LOOPS_SDK_SPECIFIER); if (typeof sdk.loops !== "function") throw new Error("@hasna/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/project-store.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/project-store.js:816`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d); const sdk = await import(LOOPS_SDK_SPECIFIER); if (typeof sdk.loops !== "function") throw new Error("@hasna/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/project-store.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/serve/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/serve/index.js:7801`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dule ?? ((specifier) => import(specifier)) }; return { todos: configuredAuthority("todos", resolved), mement
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/serve/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@hasna/projects" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: mkdir -p $HOME/.hasna/projects 2>/dev/null || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @hasna/projects
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.4 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.0.3 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v1.0.2 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.0.0 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.1.141 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v0.1.137 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.1.133 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.1.132 |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.1.130 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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