Analytics — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "@hasna/analytics",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@hasna/analytics"
},
"server": {
"name": "@hasna/analytics"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 6.3,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"ingest_pageview\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ingest_pageview\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "ingest_pageview"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([ingest_pageview]) and tools that can send data out ([ingest_pageview, get_browser_snippet]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"ingest_pageview"
],
"sinks": [
"ingest_pageview",
"get_browser_snippet"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:743`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/index.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/index.js",
"line": 743
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"ingest_pageview\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ingest_pageview\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ingest_pageview",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"endpoint\" on \"get_browser_snippet\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_browser_snippet\" takes a URL/host parameter \"endpoint\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_browser_snippet",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.endpoint"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "endpoint"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@hasna/analytics\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@hasna/analytics"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"ingest_pageview\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ingest_pageview\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ingest_pageview",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ingest_pageview"
],
"externalSink": [
"ingest_pageview"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"ingest_pageview\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ingest_pageview"
],
"externalSink": [
"ingest_pageview",
"get_browser_snippet"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"ingest_pageview",
"get_browser_snippet"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: ingest_pageview → get_browser_snippet."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "create_site",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_site",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_pageview",
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"url\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "track_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identify_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "group_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_referrers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_utm_sources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_utm_campaigns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_funnel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_browser_snippet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"endpoint\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7d4502787f2bb24e941571e28a37d993a5cb1059439aebf5d82f1442d3942d49",
"stats": {
"tools": 15,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}