Writing — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@hanna84/mcp-writing",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@hanna84/mcp-writing"
},
"server": {
"name": "@hanna84/mcp-writing"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (72 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/mcp-writing.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/mcp-writing.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/mcp-writing.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from \"node",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/mcp-writing.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/git.js"
},
"evidence": ", execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; /** * Check if a direc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/core/git.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/runtime/async-jobs.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/runtime/async-jobs.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/runtime/async-jobs.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\"; import { ASYNC_PROGRESS_PREFIX } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/runtime/async-jobs.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/scripts/manual-validation.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/scripts/manual-validation.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scripts/manual-validation.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { Client } from \"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js\"; import { SSE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scripts/manual-validation.mjs",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/scripts/mcp-debug-client.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/scripts/mcp-debug-client.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scripts/mcp-debug-client.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { Client } from \"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js\"; import { SSE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scripts/mcp-debug-client.mjs",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "describe_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_runtime_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": " to the matching ",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "propose_edit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "commit_edit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discard_edit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "snapshot_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_snapshots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_character_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_place_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_thread_arc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upsert_thread_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_reference_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upsert_reference_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect_character_place_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect_scene_character_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect_scene_place_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_character_relationship_beat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_relationship_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_chapter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_chapter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reorder_chapter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attach_epigraph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assign_scene_to_chapter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_scene_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_character_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_place_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "flag_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preview_review_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_review_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_scenes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_scene_prose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_chapter_prose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_chapters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_epigraphs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_arc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_characters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_character_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_places",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_place_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_scene_references",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_reference_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_threads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_thread_arc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_relationship_arc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_scene_references",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup_prose_styleguide_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_prose_styleguide_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "summarize_prose_styleguide_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bootstrap_prose_styleguide_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_prose_styleguide_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preview_prose_styleguide_config_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_prose_styleguide_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup_prose_styleguide_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diagnose_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_structure_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_project_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diagnose_project_backups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_structure_from_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_project_from_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_scrivener_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_scrivener_sync_async",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_scrivener_project_beta",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enrich_scene_characters_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_async_job_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_async_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_async_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enrich_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7b44a8f0177d1ce4b886de621f54cfb422f35d25469ac5c564e07167f5253cb9",
"stats": {
"tools": 72,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}