Webmcp Browser Automation Kit MCP Server

@gyga-browser/webmcp-browser-automation-kit npm v1.0.34 Source verified

Published by uyencss — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust grade
A
100/100
Last scanned
Trust
A · 100/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade

Started at 100 and nothing was deducted: the deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the published surface it inspected. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower the score.

Findings 4

high Dynamic code execution in server code (webmcp-extension/dist/content-scripts/register-tools.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`webmcp-extension/dist/content-scripts/register-tools.js:939`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: new Function(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server webmcp-extension/dist/content-scripts/register-tools.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/webmcp.mjs)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`bin/webmcp.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/webmcp.mjs

high Shell/command execution in server code (chrome-launcher/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`chrome-launcher/launcher.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server chrome-launcher/launcher.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (server/mcp_server.mjs)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`server/mcp_server.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server server/mcp_server.mjs

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.34 latest A 100/100 4 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: A · 100/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @gyga-browser/webmcp-browser-automation-kit --online

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