Cloudflare — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@gutmutcode/mcp-server-cloudflare",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@gutmutcode/mcp-server-cloudflare"
},
"server": {
"name": "@gutmutcode/mcp-server-cloudflare"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "s import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; // src/utils/wrangler.ts import fs, { mkdirSy",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:138`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "ed\" }; return await fetch(\"https://dash.cloudflare.com/oauth2/token\", { method: \"POST\", body: body.toString(",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 138,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"r2_put_object\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"r2_put_object\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"put_object\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "r2_put_object"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"r2_put_object\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"r2_put_object\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "r2_put_object"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "r2_list_buckets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "r2_create_bucket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "r2_delete_bucket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "r2_list_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "r2_get_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "r2_put_object",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"put_object\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "r2_delete_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "d1_list_databases",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "d1_create_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "d1_delete_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "d1_query",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_kvs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kv_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kv_put",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kv_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kv_list",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_keys\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "analytics_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worker_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worker_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worker_put",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worker_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9832e1f8d4fdf50605315b76e1076f3715165c1b76412e2e7405826d9cae84cf",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}