Gunicorn MCP Server
gunicorn
PyPI
v26.0.0
Published by benoitc — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −28.5 | Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code ×4 MTC-SRC-004 | injection |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 17
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (examples/dirty_example/test_protocol.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`examples/dirty_example/test_protocol.py:150`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x00\x01\x02\x03\xff\xfe\xfd\xfc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/dirty_example/test_protocol.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (gunicorn/asgi/parser.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`gunicorn/asgi/parser.py:30`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x0D\x0A\x0D\x0A\x00\x0D\x0A\x51\x55\x49\x54\x0A
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server gunicorn/asgi/parser.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (gunicorn/http/message.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`gunicorn/http/message.py:99`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x0D\x0A\x0D\x0A\x00\x0D\x0A\x51\x55\x49\x54\x0A
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server gunicorn/http/message.py
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (tests/test_asgi_proxy_protocol.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_asgi_proxy_protocol.py:62`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_asgi_proxy_protocol.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (examples/frameworks/django/testing/testing/apps/someapp/middleware.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`examples/frameworks/django/testing/testing/apps/someapp/middleware.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/frameworks/django/testing/testing/apps/someapp/middleware.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (examples/read_django_settings.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`examples/read_django_settings.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/read_django_settings.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/asgi_compliance/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/asgi_compliance/conftest.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/asgi_compliance/conftest.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/asgi_framework_compat/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/asgi_framework_compat/conftest.py:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/asgi_framework_compat/conftest.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/dirty_arbiter/test_parent_death.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/dirty_arbiter/test_parent_death.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/dirty_arbiter/test_parent_death.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/dirty_ttin_ttou/test_ttin_ttou_docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/dirty_ttin_ttou/test_ttin_ttou_docker.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/dirty_ttin_ttou/test_ttin_ttou_docker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/http2/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/http2/conftest.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/http2/conftest.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/per_app_allocation/test_per_app_e2e.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/per_app_allocation/test_per_app_e2e.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/per_app_allocation/test_per_app_e2e.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/docker/uwsgi/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/docker/uwsgi/conftest.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/docker/uwsgi/conftest.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_control_socket_integration.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_control_socket_integration.py:111`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_control_socket_integration.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (examples/frameworks/django/testing/testing/apps/someapp/middleware.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`examples/frameworks/django/testing/testing/apps/someapp/middleware.py:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: requests.get('http://requestb.in/15s95oz1'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/frameworks/django/testing/testing/apps/someapp/middleware.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (gunicorn/config.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`gunicorn/config.py:483`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server gunicorn/config.py
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"gunicorn" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package gunicorn
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v26.0.0 latest |
D 69/100 | 17 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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