@guillehr2/excel-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.22
Published by @guillehr2 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Excel MCP Server - Manipulate Excel files without Microsoft Excel. Model Context Protocol server for reading, writing XLSX XLSM files with Claude AI LLM integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`index.js:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const child = spawn('uv', uvArgs, { stdio: 'inherit' }); child.on('error', (err) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
In the server's implementation (`master_excel_mcp.py:5284`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ", outdir] subprocess.run(cmd, check=True) generated = os.path.join(outdir, Path(excel_file)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server master_excel_mcp.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_calculated_column_toolno sensitive capabilityadd_chart_toolno sensitive capabilityadd_formula_toolno sensitive capabilityadd_formulas_toolno sensitive capabilityadd_sheet_toolno sensitive capabilityadd_table_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_chart_from_data_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_formatted_table_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_sheet_with_data_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_workbook_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_sheet_toolno sensitive capabilityexport_pdf_toolno sensitive capabilityfilter_data_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_sheets_toolno sensitive capabilityopen_workbook_toolno sensitive capabilityoptimize_excel_file_toolno sensitive capabilityrename_sheet_toolno sensitive capabilitysave_workbook_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_cell_toolno sensitive capabilitywrite_sheet_data_toolno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.22 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @guillehr2/excel-mcp-server --online
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 11 side by side →
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