Gristle — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "gristle",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "gristle"
},
"server": {
"name": "gristle"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 71,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"gateCap": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 22
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [
"1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C"
],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/test_security.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/test_security.py:41`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_security.py"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "tests/test_security.py",
"line": 41
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/gristle/viz/assets/cytoscape.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gristle/viz/assets/cytoscape.min.js:23`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gristle/viz/assets/cytoscape.min.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/gristle/viz/assets/cytoscape.min.js",
"line": 23
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/gristle/viz/assets/dagre.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gristle/viz/assets/dagre.min.js:2118`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gristle/viz/assets/dagre.min.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/gristle/viz/assets/dagre.min.js",
"line": 2118
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (tests/test_security.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_security.py:268`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_security.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_security.py",
"line": 268
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gristle/parsers/security.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gristle/parsers/security.py:232`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gristle/parsers/security.py"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gristle/parsers/security.py",
"line": 232
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_security.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_security.py:196`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_security.py"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_security.py",
"line": 196
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (tests/test_typescript_parser.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_typescript_parser.py:1688`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_typescript_parser.py"
},
"evidence": "import(path)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_typescript_parser.py",
"line": 1688
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "gristle_ingest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_ingest_github",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_watch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_explore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_impact_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_change_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_changeset_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_routes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_deps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_conventions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_embed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_semantic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_drop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_data_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_type_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_dead_exports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_cycles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_public_api",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_unauthenticated_routes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_dependency_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_services",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_changelog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_model_detail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_db_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gristle_subgraph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "12252ebf5ab22b08b39e92735b5efe6be1f70ae6abd96456366a34f8f3a39989",
"stats": {
"tools": 35,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}