Gravitykit MCP Server
@gravitykit/mcp
npm
v2.4.1
Source verified
Published by gravitykit — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Full-featured MCP server for Gravity Forms
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([gk_reload_abilities]) co-exist with external-action tools ([gf_send_notifications]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [gk_reload_abilities] → sinks [gf_send_notifications]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow gk_reload_abilities → gf_send_notifications
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/field-definitions/loader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/field-definitions/loader.js:129`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const module = await import(distPath); const { fieldRegistry } = module; if (fieldRegistry && fiel
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/field-definitions/loader.js
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gf_send_notificationsnetwork egressgk_reload_abilitiesingests untrusted inputgf_create_entryno sensitive capabilitygf_create_feedno sensitive capabilitygf_create_formno sensitive capabilitygf_delete_entryno sensitive capabilitygf_delete_feedno sensitive capabilitygf_delete_formno sensitive capabilitygf_get_entryno sensitive capabilitygf_get_feedno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
gf_get_field_filtersno sensitive capabilitygf_get_formno sensitive capabilitygf_get_resultsno sensitive capabilitygf_list_entriesno sensitive capabilitygf_list_feedsno sensitive capabilitygf_list_formsno sensitive capabilitygf_patch_feedno sensitive capabilitygf_submit_form_datano sensitive capabilitygf_update_entryno sensitive capabilitygf_update_feedno sensitive capabilitygf_update_formno sensitive capabilitygf_validate_formno sensitive capabilitygf_validate_submissionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @gravitykit/mcp --onlineMore in Content Management
Apify MCP Server
Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server for the *@inkeep/agents-mcp* API.
Medicare spending, chronic conditions, hospital quality, readmissions, and enrollment
Public read-only MCP for products, frameworks, guides, methodology, and blog metadata.
Community-maintained MCP server for Atlassian Confluence Data Center. Not affiliated with Atlassian.
MCP server for Contentful Content Management API integration