Governflow MCP Server

governflow npm v1.0.0-alpha.5

Published by sole03 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

GovernFlow — AI-native code governance pipeline. Four-layer assemble-over-build architecture.

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 99 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−1.2 Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 2

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/cli.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir } from "node:o

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/transport/cli.js

low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"governflow" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.

Evidence: npx prisma generate

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package governflow

Tools 19

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • analyze_workspaceno sensitive capability
  • capture_diffno sensitive capability
  • cognition_approve_injectionno sensitive capability
  • cognition_feedbackno sensitive capability
  • cognition_queryno sensitive capability
  • cognition_update_configno sensitive capability
  • cognition_validateno sensitive capability
  • confirm_ruleno sensitive capability
  • governance_pause_arbitratorno sensitive capability
  • governance_rollback_arbitrationno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
  • immune_cycleno sensitive capability
  • immune_statsno sensitive capability
  • list_rulesno sensitive capability
  • query_rulesno sensitive capability
  • resolve_conflictno sensitive capability
  • workflow_escalateno sensitive capability
  • workflow_statusno sensitive capability
  • workflow_submitno sensitive capability
  • workflow_voteno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.0-alpha.5 latest A 92/100 2 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan governflow --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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