Sequential Thinking (gotza02) MCP Server
@gotza02/sequential-thinking
npm
v10000.2.2
Published by @gotza02 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for sequential thinking and problem solving (Extended with Web Search & Graph)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: analyze_football_match_v2 → list_directory → fetch. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow analyze_football_match_v2 → list_directory → fetch
high Tool "shell_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_execute
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/intelligent-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/intelligent-code.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import ts from 'typescript'; import { validate
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/intelligent-code.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/coding.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/coding.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export func
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/coding.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import * as path from 'node:path'; import * as fs from 'node:fs'; import * as dn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils.js
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool edit_file
low Mutating tool "shell_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_execute
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool edit_file
Tools 71
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetchingests untrusted inputnetwork egressanalyze_football_match_v2ingests untrusted inputedit_filewrites fileslist_directoryreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive datashell_executeruns code / shellweb_searchingests untrusted inputwrite_filewrites filesadd_code_snippetno sensitive capabilityadd_knowledge_entityno sensitive capability
Show 61 more tools ↓
analyze_football_matchno sensitive capabilityanalyze_football_match_structuredno sensitive capabilityanalyze_roino sensitive capabilityask_humanno sensitive capabilitybuild_project_graphno sensitive capabilitycheck_alertsno sensitive capabilityclear_old_interactionsno sensitive capabilityclear_thought_historyno sensitive capabilitycompare_teamsno sensitive capabilitydeep_code_analyzeno sensitive capabilitydeep_code_editno sensitive capabilitydelete_knowledge_entityno sensitive capabilityfile_existsno sensitive capabilityforce_rebuild_graphno sensitive capabilityget_file_relationshipsno sensitive capabilityget_interaction_historyno sensitive capabilityget_league_fixturesno sensitive capabilityget_league_standingsno sensitive capabilityget_league_standings_v2no sensitive capabilityget_live_scoresno sensitive capabilityget_match_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_pending_predictionsno sensitive capabilityget_pending_questionsno sensitive capabilityget_project_graph_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_project_graph_visualizationno sensitive capabilityget_team_infono sensitive capabilityget_thinking_blocksno sensitive capabilityget_top_scorersno sensitive capabilityget_top_scorers_v2no sensitive capabilityintelligent_code_analyzeno sensitive capabilityintelligent_code_autofixno sensitive capabilityintelligent_code_compareno sensitive capabilityintelligent_impact_analysisno sensitive capabilityintelligent_refactor_suggestno sensitive capabilityintelligent_semantic_searchno sensitive capabilitylearn_architecture_patternno sensitive capabilitylink_knowledge_nodesno sensitive capabilitymanage_notesno sensitive capabilityodds_comparisonno sensitive capabilityodds_converterno sensitive capabilityplayer_analysisno sensitive capabilityprobability_calculatorno sensitive capabilityquery_knowledge_graphno sensitive capabilityread_webpageno sensitive capabilityreferee_profileno sensitive capabilityresolve_predictionno sensitive capabilityrespond_to_humanno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_code_dbno sensitive capabilitysearch_thoughtsno sensitive capabilitysequentialthinkingno sensitive capabilitystart_thinking_blockno sensitive capabilitysummarize_historyno sensitive capabilitytactical_breakdownno sensitive capabilitytrack_predictionno sensitive capabilitytransfer_newsno sensitive capabilityvalue_bet_calculatorno sensitive capabilitywatchlist_addno sensitive capabilitywatchlist_clearno sensitive capabilitywatchlist_listno sensitive capabilitywatchlist_removeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (71 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v10000.2.2 latest |
B 89/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @gotza02/sequential-thinking --onlineOther implementations of Sequential Thinking 9
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