Google Workspace (PyPI) MCP Server
google-workspace-mcp
PyPI
v2.0.9
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Google Workspace integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([drive_read_file_content]) and tools that can send data out ([gmail_send_email]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [drive_read_file_content] → sinks [gmail_send_email]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow drive_read_file_content → gmail_send_email
medium Tool "drive_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "drive_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool drive_delete_file
low Mutating tool "drive_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "drive_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drive_delete_file
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
drive_delete_filewrites filesdrive_read_file_contentreads sensitive datagmail_send_emailnetwork egressadd_bulleted_list_to_slideno sensitive capabilityadd_image_to_slideno sensitive capabilityadd_slide_notesno sensitive capabilityadd_table_to_slideno sensitive capabilityadd_text_to_slideno sensitive capabilitycalendar_get_event_detailsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_get_eventsno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
create_calendar_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_gmail_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_presentationno sensitive capabilitycreate_presentation_from_markdownno sensitive capabilitycreate_slideno sensitive capabilitydelete_calendar_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_gmail_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_slideno sensitive capabilitydocs_append_textno sensitive capabilitydocs_batch_updateno sensitive capabilitydocs_create_documentno sensitive capabilitydocs_get_content_as_markdownno sensitive capabilitydocs_insert_imageno sensitive capabilitydocs_insert_textno sensitive capabilitydocs_prepend_textno sensitive capabilitydrive_create_folderno sensitive capabilitydrive_list_shared_drivesno sensitive capabilitydrive_rename_fileno sensitive capabilitydrive_search_filesno sensitive capabilityduplicate_slideno sensitive capabilityget_presentationno sensitive capabilityget_slidesno sensitive capabilitygmail_bulk_delete_messagesno sensitive capabilitygmail_get_attachment_contentno sensitive capabilitygmail_get_message_detailsno sensitive capabilitygmail_reply_to_emailno sensitive capabilitygmail_send_draftno sensitive capabilityquery_gmail_emailsno sensitive capabilitysheets_create_spreadsheetno sensitive capabilitysheets_set_column_widthno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.9 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.0.8 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan google-workspace-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Google Workspace 13
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 14 side by side →
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