Google Workspace Alias MCP Server
google-workspace-alias-mcp
npm
v1.1.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Google Workspace (Gmail + Calendar) with send-as alias support, email templates, scheduled send, attachments, batch operations, and full feature parity
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 12 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from "child_process"; import http from "http"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([read_email, download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [read_email, download_attachment] → sinks [send_email]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow read_email → send_email
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`index.js:924`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : "xdg-open"; exec(`${command} "${authUrl}"`, (error) => { if (error) { console.error(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputread_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressauthenticateno sensitive capabilitybatch_delete_emailsno sensitive capabilitybatch_modify_emailsno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
delete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydraft_emailno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_freebusyno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilitylist_aliasesno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_email_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitymodify_emailno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_eventsno sensitive capabilitysend_scheduled_emailno sensitive capabilitysend_template_emailno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.2 latest |
B 82/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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