Chrome Enterprise Premium MCP Server
@google/chrome-enterprise-premium-mcp
npm
v1.10.0
Published by @google — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Chrome Enterprise Premium MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/util/cli_invocation.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/util/cli_invocation.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process' const BIN_NAME = 'chrome-enterprise-premium-mcp' const NPX_FORM = `npx -y @googl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/util/cli_invocation.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/util/gcp.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`lib/util/gcp.js:53`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await axios.get(`http://metadata.google.internal${path}`, { headers: { 'Metadata-Flavor': 'G
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/util/gcp.js
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_documentsingests untrusted inputcep_auth_clearno sensitive capabilitycep_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_and_enable_cep_apino sensitive capabilitycheck_cep_subscriptionno sensitive capabilitycheck_ev_extension_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_seb_extension_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_user_cep_licenseno sensitive capabilitycount_browser_versionsno sensitive capabilitycreate_caa_access_levelno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
create_chrome_dlp_ruleno sensitive capabilitycreate_default_dlp_rulesno sensitive capabilitycreate_regex_detectorno sensitive capabilitycreate_secure_gatewayno sensitive capabilitycreate_secure_gateway_applicationno sensitive capabilitycreate_url_list_detectorno sensitive capabilitycreate_word_list_detectorno sensitive capabilitydelete_agent_dlp_ruleno sensitive capabilitydelete_detectorno sensitive capabilitydelete_secure_gateway_applicationno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_environmentno sensitive capabilityenable_chrome_enterprise_connectorsno sensitive capabilityenable_service_discoveryno sensitive capabilityget_chrome_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_connector_policyno sensitive capabilityget_customer_idno sensitive capabilityget_dlp_ruleno sensitive capabilityget_documentno sensitive capabilityget_secure_gatewayno sensitive capabilityget_secure_gateway_applicationno sensitive capabilityget_secure_gateway_application_iam_policyno sensitive capabilityget_secure_gateway_iam_policyno sensitive capabilityinstall_ev_extensionno sensitive capabilityinstall_seb_extensionno sensitive capabilitylist_caa_access_levelsno sensitive capabilitylist_customer_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_detectorsno sensitive capabilitylist_dlp_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_org_unitsno sensitive capabilitylist_secure_gateway_applicationsno sensitive capabilitylist_secure_gatewaysno sensitive capabilitysearch_contentno sensitive capabilitysearch_organizationsno sensitive capabilitysecurity_insightsno sensitive capabilitysecurity_insights_datano sensitive capabilityset_secure_gateway_application_iam_policyno sensitive capabilityset_secure_gateway_iam_policyno sensitive capabilityupdate_secure_gatewayno sensitive capabilityupdate_secure_gateway_applicationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.10.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.9.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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