Google Automation MCP Server
google-automation-mcp
PyPI
v0.7.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Headless Google Workspace automation for AI - Apps Script, Gmail, Drive, Sheets, Calendar, Docs, Tasks, Forms
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "run_script_function_tool" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script_function_tool" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script_function_tool
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/google_automation_mcp/auth/clasp.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/google_automation_mcp/auth/clasp.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["npx", "@google/clasp", "--version"], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/google_automation_mcp/auth/clasp.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/google_automation_mcp/router/script_template.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/google_automation_mcp/router/script_template.js:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nt. try { UrlFetchApp.fetch('https://www.googleapis.com/tasks/v1/users/@me/lists?maxResults=1', { headers: {'Autho
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/google_automation_mcp/router/script_template.js
low Mutating tool "run_script_function_tool" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script_function_tool" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script_function_tool
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
run_script_function_toolruns code / shelladd_form_question_toolno sensitive capabilityappend_doc_text_toolno sensitive capabilityappend_sheet_values_toolno sensitive capabilitycomplete_google_auth_toolno sensitive capabilitycomplete_task_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_deployment_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_doc_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_drive_file_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_drive_folder_toolno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
create_event_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_form_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_script_project_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_spreadsheet_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_task_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_version_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_deployment_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_drive_file_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_event_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_script_project_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_task_toolno sensitive capabilitygenerate_trigger_codeno sensitive capabilityget_doc_content_toolno sensitive capabilityget_drive_file_content_toolno sensitive capabilityget_events_toolno sensitive capabilityget_form_responses_toolno sensitive capabilityget_form_toolno sensitive capabilityget_gmail_message_toolno sensitive capabilityget_script_content_toolno sensitive capabilityget_script_metrics_toolno sensitive capabilityget_script_project_toolno sensitive capabilityget_sheet_values_toolno sensitive capabilityget_spreadsheet_metadata_toolno sensitive capabilityget_tasks_toolno sensitive capabilityget_version_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_calendars_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_deployments_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_drive_items_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_drive_permissions_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_gmail_labels_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_script_processes_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_script_projects_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_spreadsheets_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_task_lists_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_versions_toolno sensitive capabilitymodify_doc_text_toolno sensitive capabilitymodify_gmail_labels_toolno sensitive capabilityremove_drive_permission_toolno sensitive capabilitysearch_docs_toolno sensitive capabilitysearch_drive_files_toolno sensitive capabilitysearch_gmail_messages_toolno sensitive capabilitysend_gmail_message_toolno sensitive capabilityshare_drive_file_toolno sensitive capabilitystart_google_auth_toolno sensitive capabilitytrash_drive_file_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_deployment_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_event_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_script_content_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_sheet_values_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_task_toolno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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