Cc Agent MCP Server
@gonzih/cc-agent
npm
v0.16.15
Published by @gonzih — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for spawning Claude Code agents in cloned repos — branch your agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: work_on_issue → get_logs ⇒ send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow work_on_issue → get_logs → send_message
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/docker.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/docker.js:71`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst npmrcPath = `${home}/.npmrc`; if (existsSync(npmrcPath)) { args.push("-v", `${npmrcPath}:/root/.npmrc:ro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/docker.js
high Tool "spawn_agent" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_agent" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_agent
high Tool "spawn_from_profile" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_from_profile" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_from_profile
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { mkdtemp, rm, appendFile, mkdir, readFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claude.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/claude.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "events"; import { join } from "path"; import { tmp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/claude.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/docker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/docker.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "events"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/docker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/aider.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/aider.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { getPricing } from "./pricing.js"; import { BaseAgentProcess } from "./t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/aider.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/amp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/amp.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { getPricing } from "./pricing.js"; import { BaseAgentProcess } from "./t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/amp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/claude-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/claude-code.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return false; } spawn(options) { // Extract ollama config encoded in env by agent.ts const ollam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/claude-code.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/codex.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/codex.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { getPricing } from "./pricing.js"; import { BaseAgentProcess } from "./t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/codex.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/gemini.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/gemini.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { getPricing } from "./pricing.js"; import { BaseAgentProcess } from "./t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/gemini.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/openai-compatible.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/openai-compatible.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { writeFile, readFile, readdir } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/openai-compatible.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Mutating tool "spawn_agent" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_agent" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_agent
low Mutating tool "spawn_from_profile" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_from_profile" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_from_profile
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_logsreads sensitive datasend_messagenetwork egressspawn_agentruns code / shellspawn_from_profileruns code / shellwork_on_issueingests untrusted inputapprove_jobno sensitive capabilitycancel_jobno sensitive capabilityclear_learningsno sensitive capabilityclose_issueno sensitive capabilitycomment_on_issueno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
cost_summaryno sensitive capabilitycreate_cronno sensitive capabilitycreate_planno sensitive capabilitycreate_profileno sensitive capabilitydelete_cronno sensitive capabilitydelete_profileno sensitive capabilitydelete_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilitydocker_psno sensitive capabilityexport_jobsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_cost_reportno sensitive capabilityget_job_outputno sensitive capabilityget_job_statusno sensitive capabilityget_learningsno sensitive capabilityget_pubsub_statusno sensitive capabilityget_swarm_statusno sensitive capabilityget_versionno sensitive capabilityget_wikino sensitive capabilityget_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_active_reposno sensitive capabilitylist_cronsno sensitive capabilitylist_driversno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_model_ratingsno sensitive capabilitylist_notificationsno sensitive capabilitylist_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_token_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_wiki_pagesno sensitive capabilitysearch_jobsno sensitive capabilityset_job_scoreno sensitive capabilityswarm_taskno sensitive capabilityupdate_cronno sensitive capabilityupdate_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilitywait_for_jobno sensitive capabilitywake_jobno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.15 latest |
B 89/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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