Golem 3dmcp MCP Server

golem-3dmcp PyPI v0.2.2

Published by thekinghippopotamus — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

The most powerful MCP server for Rhinoceros 3D — 105 tools giving AI agents full read/write access to Rhino 8

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py:319`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try: raw = eval(expression, namespace) # noqa: S307 -- intentional escape hatch except Exception as ex

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py:319`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try: raw = eval(expression, namespace) # noqa: S307 -- intentional escape hatch except Exception as ex

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py:196`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: r_capture): exec(code, namespace) # noqa: S102 -- intentional escape hatch except Exception as exc:

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/golem_3dmcp/_rhino_plugin/handlers/scripting.py

Tools 89

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • add_named_viewno sensitive capability
  • align_objectsno sensitive capability
  • apply_transformno sensitive capability
  • array_objects_linearno sensitive capability
  • array_objects_polarno sensitive capability
  • bake_grasshopper_objectsno sensitive capability
  • boolean_differenceno sensitive capability
  • boolean_intersectionno sensitive capability
  • boolean_unionno sensitive capability
  • cap_planar_holesno sensitive capability
Show 79 more tools ↓
  • capture_viewportno sensitive capability
  • close_grasshopper_definitionno sensitive capability
  • convert_to_nurbsno sensitive capability
  • copy_objectsno sensitive capability
  • create_arcno sensitive capability
  • create_boxno sensitive capability
  • create_circleno sensitive capability
  • create_coneno sensitive capability
  • create_cylinderno sensitive capability
  • create_layerno sensitive capability
  • create_lineno sensitive capability
  • create_nurbs_curveno sensitive capability
  • create_pointno sensitive capability
  • create_polylineno sensitive capability
  • create_sphereno sensitive capability
  • create_textno sensitive capability
  • create_torusno sensitive capability
  • delete_layerno sensitive capability
  • delete_objectsno sensitive capability
  • deselect_allno sensitive capability
  • distribute_objectsno sensitive capability
  • evaluate_expressionno sensitive capability
  • execute_pythonno sensitive capability
  • execute_rhinoscriptno sensitive capability
  • explode_objectno sensitive capability
  • export_documentno sensitive capability
  • export_objectsno sensitive capability
  • extrude_curveno sensitive capability
  • fillet_curvesno sensitive capability
  • get_document_infono sensitive capability
  • get_document_pathno sensitive capability
  • get_grasshopper_outputsno sensitive capability
  • get_object_infono sensitive capability
  • get_selected_objectsno sensitive capability
  • group_objectsno sensitive capability
  • hide_objectsno sensitive capability
  • import_fileno sensitive capability
  • join_curvesno sensitive capability
  • list_grasshopper_componentsno sensitive capability
  • list_layersno sensitive capability
  • list_objectsno sensitive capability
  • list_viewsno sensitive capability
  • lock_objectsno sensitive capability
  • loft_curvesno sensitive capability
  • mesh_from_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • mirror_objectsno sensitive capability
  • move_objectsno sensitive capability
  • new_documentno sensitive capability
  • offset_curveno sensitive capability
  • offset_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • open_grasshopper_definitionno sensitive capability
  • orient_objectsno sensitive capability
  • patch_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • planar_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • rebuild_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • restore_named_viewno sensitive capability
  • revolve_curveno sensitive capability
  • rotate_objectsno sensitive capability
  • run_grasshopper_definitionno sensitive capability
  • run_rhino_commandno sensitive capability
  • save_documentno sensitive capability
  • save_document_asno sensitive capability
  • scale_objectsno sensitive capability
  • scale_objects_1dno sensitive capability
  • scale_objects_2dno sensitive capability
  • select_objectsno sensitive capability
  • set_active_viewno sensitive capability
  • set_background_colorno sensitive capability
  • set_camerano sensitive capability
  • set_display_modeno sensitive capability
  • set_grasshopper_inputno sensitive capability
  • set_object_layerno sensitive capability
  • set_object_nameno sensitive capability
  • set_user_textno sensitive capability
  • sweep_1_railno sensitive capability
  • sweep_2_railsno sensitive capability
  • ungroup_objectsno sensitive capability
  • zoom_extentsno sensitive capability
  • zoom_selectedno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.2 latest A 93/100 3 1.13.0 2026-08-25
v0.2.1 A 93/100 3 1.12.1 2026-07-27

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan golem-3dmcp --online --registry pypi

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