gogcli-mcp-gmail
npm
v2.29.0
Source verified
Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Extended Gmail MCP server via gogcli — auth + full Gmail support (threads, labels, drafts, attachments, forward, autoreply, bulk operations)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2946`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:31651`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ?? (await import("node:child_process")).spawn; const effectiveTimeout = timeout ?? TIMEOUT_MS; return new Promise((
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gog_gmail_attachmentingests untrusted inputgog_gmail_rawreads sensitive datagog_gmail_thread_attachmentsingests untrusted inputgog_gmail_thread_getingests untrusted inputgog_gmail_autoreplyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_batch_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_batch_modifyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_createno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_diffno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_forwardno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_getno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_listno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_replyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_reply_allno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_sendno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_drafts_updateno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_filters_createno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_filters_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_filters_getno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_filters_listno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_forwardno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_historyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_importno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_createno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_getno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_listno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_modifyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_renameno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_labels_styleno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_message_modifyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_messages_searchno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendas_createno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendas_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendas_getno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendas_listno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendas_updateno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendas_verifyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_thread_modifyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_urlno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_vacation_getno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_vacation_updateno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.29.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.27.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.27.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.26.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v2.25.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v2.24.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v2.23.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.23.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.22.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.20.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gogcli-mcp-gmail --online
One key, 100+ models — chat with any LLM and generate video, images, speech. Free trial at 370.ai.
Retired compatibility stub for the AgentCanary MCP server. Daily briefs continue on X and Telegram.
A Backstage plugin that provides a chat interface for interacting with the MCP Servers.
Signal-first Bitcoin intelligence: sovereign, hiring & hashrate signals over MCP.
WhatsApp® reminders and rescheduling for Calendly. Public read-only MCP endpoint.
Open Source Generic MCP Client for testing & evaluating mcp servers and agents