Gogcli Mcp Drive MCP Server
gogcli-mcp-drive
npm
v2.29.0
Source verified
Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Extended Google Drive MCP server via gogcli — auth + full Drive support (upload/download/permissions/comments/shared drives)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2946`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:31667`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ?? (await import("node:child_process")).spawn; const effectiveTimeout = timeout ?? TIMEOUT_MS; return new Promise((
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gog_drive_downloadingests untrusted inputgog_drive_activityno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_audit_sharingno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_audit_userno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_changes_listno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_changes_start_tokenno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_addno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_getno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_listno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
gog_drive_comments_reopenno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_replyno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_resolveno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_comments_updateno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_copyno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_drives_listno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_duno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_labels_file_applyno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_labels_file_listno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_labels_file_removeno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_labels_getno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_labels_listno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_permissionsno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_revisions_getno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_revisions_listno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_shortcut_createno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_sync_pushno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_treeno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_unshareno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_uploadno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_urlno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.29.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.27.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.27.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.26.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v2.25.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.24.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v2.23.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.23.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.22.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.20.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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