Google Calendar (gogcli) MCP Server
gogcli-mcp-calendar
npm
v2.29.0
Source verified
Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Google Calendar and Google Meet MCP server built on gogcli, covering auth, calendar events, and Meet space management.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2946`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:31667`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ?? (await import("node:child_process")).spawn; const effectiveTimeout = timeout ?? TIMEOUT_MS; return new Promise((
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gog_calendar_aclno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_calendarsno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_changedno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_colorsno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_delete_calendarno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_freebusyno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_moveno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_out_of_officeno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_searchno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_unsubscribeno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
gog_meet_createno sensitive capabilitygog_meet_endno sensitive capabilitygog_meet_getno sensitive capabilitygog_meet_historyno sensitive capabilitygog_meet_participantsno sensitive capabilitygog_meet_updateno sensitive capabilitygog_zoom_auth_doctorno sensitive capabilitygog_zoom_auth_setupno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.29.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v2.27.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.27.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v2.26.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v2.25.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.24.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v2.23.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.23.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.22.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.20.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gogcli-mcp-calendar --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
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