Gogcli MCP Server
gogcli-mcp
npm
v2.29.1
Source verified
Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server wrapping gogcli for Google service access
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2946`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/lib.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib.js:2945`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:36058`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ?? (await import("node:child_process")).spawn; const effectiveTimeout = timeout ?? TIMEOUT_MS; return new Promise((
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib.js:27865`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ?? (await import("node:child_process")).spawn; const effectiveTimeout = timeout ?? TIMEOUT_MS; return new Promise((
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/runner.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/runner.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import { delimiter, join } from 'node:path'; import { parseBoolEnv, readEnvVar,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/runner.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/worker.test.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/worker.test.ts:51`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await SELF.fetch('https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server'); expect(res.status).toBe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/worker.test.ts
low Hardcoded Google API key in test/example/packaging (tests/runner.test.ts)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Google API key (a client API key (restricted by referrer/quota, not a private secret)) appears in `tests/runner.test.ts:548`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/runner.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/auth-log.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/auth-log.test.ts:453`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: urce); await expect(exec(['--json', '--color=never', '--no-input', 'gmail', 'search', 'q'], {})).resolves.toBe(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/auth-log.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/connector-runtime.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/connector-runtime.test.ts:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const out = await exec(['sheets', 'get', 'A1'], {}); expect(out).toBe('gog output'); const [url, init] =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/connector-runtime.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/runner.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/runner.test.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ockedSpawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { run, runBinary, runExecutor, RunnerTransportError, isRunnerTransportErr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/runner.test.ts
Tools 103
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gog_chat_messages_listingests untrusted inputgog_classroom_profile_getingests untrusted inputgog_drive_lsreads sensitive datagog_drive_read_bytesingests untrusted inputgog_api_callno sensitive capabilitygog_api_describeno sensitive capabilitygog_api_listno sensitive capabilitygog_appscript_contentno sensitive capabilitygog_appscript_createno sensitive capabilitygog_appscript_deploymentsno sensitive capability
Show 93 more tools ↓
gog_appscript_getno sensitive capabilitygog_appscript_pullno sensitive capabilitygog_appscript_run_functionno sensitive capabilitygog_appscript_versionsno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_addno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_add_completeno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_add_urlno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_healthno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_listno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_servicesno sensitive capabilitygog_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_createno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_eventsno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_getno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_respondno sensitive capabilitygog_calendar_updateno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_dm_sendno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_dm_spaceno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_messages_searchno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_messages_sendno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_reactions_createno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_reactions_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_reactions_listno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_spaces_createno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_spaces_findno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_spaces_listno sensitive capabilitygog_chat_threads_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_announcements_createno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_announcements_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_announcements_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_courses_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_courses_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_coursework_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_coursework_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_invitations_acceptno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_invitations_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_invitations_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_rosterno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_students_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_students_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_submissions_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_submissions_gradeno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_submissions_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_submissions_reclaimno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_submissions_returnno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_submissions_turn_inno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_teachers_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_teachers_listno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_topics_getno sensitive capabilitygog_classroom_topics_listno sensitive capabilitygog_contacts_createno sensitive capabilitygog_contacts_getno sensitive capabilitygog_contacts_listno sensitive capabilitygog_contacts_searchno sensitive capabilitygog_docs_catno sensitive capabilitygog_docs_createno sensitive capabilitygog_docs_find_replaceno sensitive capabilitygog_docs_infono sensitive capabilitygog_docs_structureno sensitive capabilitygog_docs_writeno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_extract_textno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_getno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_mkdirno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_moveno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_renameno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_searchno sensitive capabilitygog_drive_shareno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_getno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_replyno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_reply_allno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_searchno sensitive capabilitygog_gmail_sendno sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_appendno sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_clearno sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_createno sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_find_replaceno sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_getno sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_metadatano sensitive capabilitygog_sheets_updateno sensitive capabilitygog_slides_copyno sensitive capabilitygog_slides_createno sensitive capabilitygog_slides_exportno sensitive capabilitygog_slides_infono sensitive capabilitygog_slides_list_slidesno sensitive capabilitygog_slides_read_slideno sensitive capabilitygog_tasks_addno sensitive capabilitygog_tasks_deleteno sensitive capabilitygog_tasks_doneno sensitive capabilitygog_tasks_getno sensitive capabilitygog_tasks_listno sensitive capabilitygog_tasks_listsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (103 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.29.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v2.29.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.27.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.27.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.26.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.25.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v2.24.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v2.23.2 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.23.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.22.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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