Godot Mcp Pilot MCP Server
godot-mcp-pilot
npm
v1.0.0
Published by pushks18 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for AI-driven Godot game development — launch editor, run projects, edit scenes and scripts via natural language
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/godot-process.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/godot-process.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: clearDebugOutput; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const config_js_1 = require("./config.js"); /** Sing
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/godot-process.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/execution.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/execution.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const config_js_1 = require("../config.js"); const g
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/execution.js
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_autoloadno sensitive capabilityadd_input_actionno sensitive capabilityadd_nodeno sensitive capabilityadd_script_functionno sensitive capabilityadd_signalno sensitive capabilityadd_variableno sensitive capabilityanalyze_scriptno sensitive capabilitycreate_sceneno sensitive capabilitycreate_scriptno sensitive capabilityduplicate_nodeno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
edit_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_asset_infono sensitive capabilityget_debug_outputno sensitive capabilityget_godot_versionno sensitive capabilityget_main_sceneno sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_uidno sensitive capabilityinstantiate_sceneno sensitive capabilitylaunch_editorno sensitive capabilitylist_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_autoloadsno sensitive capabilitylist_input_actionsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_scenesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_scriptsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_script_functionsno sensitive capabilityload_spriteno sensitive capabilitymodify_scriptno sensitive capabilitymove_nodeno sensitive capabilityread_sceneno sensitive capabilityread_scriptno sensitive capabilityremove_autoloadno sensitive capabilityremove_input_actionno sensitive capabilityremove_nodeno sensitive capabilityremove_script_functionno sensitive capabilityrun_gdscriptno sensitive capabilityrun_projectno sensitive capabilitysave_sceneno sensitive capabilityset_main_sceneno sensitive capabilityset_project_settingno sensitive capabilityset_scene_scriptno sensitive capabilitystop_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_uidsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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