Godot Mcp Enhanced MCP Server
godot-mcp-enhanced
npm
v0.32.11
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Enhanced MCP server for Godot game engine - closed-loop AI development with dynamic GDScript execution, scene tree query, node inspection, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/gdscript-executor.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/gdscript-executor.js:68`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \b/, label: 'JavaScript eval (web escape)' }, { pattern: /\bstr2var\b/, label: 'str2var (arbitrary deserialization)'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/gdscript-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/capability/diff-matrix.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/capability/diff-matrix.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { registerAllModules } from '../modu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/capability/diff-matrix.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/clients/codex.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/cli/clients/codex.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli/clients/codex.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/clients/opencode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/cli/clients/opencode.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { join } from 'path'; import { readJson
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli/clients/opencode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/web-exporter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/cli/web-exporter.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { InternalError } from '../core/tool-er
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli/web-exporter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/blender-finder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/blender-finder.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { getL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/blender-finder.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/blender-spawn.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/blender-spawn.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { forceKillTree } from './process-state.js'; import { buildSafeEnv } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/blender-spawn.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/bpy-sandbox.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/bpy-sandbox.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bos\.system\b/, label: 'os.system (system command)' }, { pattern: /\bos\.popen\b/, label: 'os.popen (system command)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/bpy-sandbox.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/bridge-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/bridge-client.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { getErrorMessage } from '../types.js'; import { parseAutoloadNames } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/bridge-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/editor-auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/editor-auth.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { userInfo } from 'os'; import { getLogger } from './logger.js'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/editor-auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/godot-finder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/godot-finder.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { getLogger } from './logger.js'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/godot-finder.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/core/bpy-sandbox.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/core/bpy-sandbox.js:21`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import__\s*\(/, label: '__import__ (dynamic import bypass)' }, { pattern: /\bctypes\b/, label: 'ctypes (native code
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/bpy-sandbox.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-protocol-versions.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-protocol-versions.mjs:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '); const mod = await import(sdkPath).catch(() => null) || (await import(join(root, 'node_modules', '@modelcontext
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-protocol-versions.mjs
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
godot-mcp-enhancedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.32.11 latest |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.32.6 |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.29.0 |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.26.0 |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.24.0 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.23.0 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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