Gocushy MCP Server
@gocushy/mcp
npm
v0.15.0
Published by @gocushy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
gocushy MCP server — let AI agents create checkouts, offers, and follow-ups that sell
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: create_product → connect_paypal → connect_notifications. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow create_product → connect_paypal → connect_notifications
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "delivery_url" on "create_product"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_product" takes a URL/host parameter "delivery_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_product · inputSchema.properties.delivery_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "connect_notifications"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "connect_notifications" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool connect_notifications · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
connect_notificationsnetwork egressconnect_paypalreads sensitive datacreate_productingests untrusted inputcreate_webhooknetwork egressreport_ad_spendingests untrusted inputactivate_taxno sensitive capabilityadd_tax_registrationno sensitive capabilityauthorize_paymentno sensitive capabilitycancel_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityconnect_emailno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
connect_paymentno sensitive capabilityconnect_walletno sensitive capabilitycreate_affiliateno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaign_linkno sensitive capabilitycreate_cartno sensitive capabilitycreate_couponno sensitive capabilitycreate_offerno sensitive capabilitydelete_followupno sensitive capabilityget_activityno sensitive capabilityget_affiliate_linkno sensitive capabilityget_attribution_reportno sensitive capabilityget_checkout_linkno sensitive capabilityget_embed_codeno sensitive capabilityget_offer_statsno sensitive capabilityget_orders_behindno sensitive capabilityget_quoteno sensitive capabilityget_roasno sensitive capabilityget_salesno sensitive capabilityimport_productsno sensitive capabilitylist_affiliatesno sensitive capabilitylist_campaign_linksno sensitive capabilitylist_couponsno sensitive capabilitylist_followupsno sensitive capabilitylist_offersno sensitive capabilitylist_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_productsno sensitive capabilitylist_tax_registrationsno sensitive capabilitymark_commissions_paidno sensitive capabilitypayment_statusno sensitive capabilityread_offerno sensitive capabilityrefund_orderno sensitive capabilityseller_defaultsno sensitive capabilityset_business_detailsno sensitive capabilityset_conversion_trackingno sensitive capabilityset_followupno sensitive capabilitytax_statusno sensitive capabilityupdate_campaign_linkno sensitive capabilityupdate_checkoutno sensitive capabilityupdate_followupno sensitive capabilityupdate_productno sensitive capabilityverify_purchaseno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.15.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.13.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @gocushy/mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
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