Gobby — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "gobby",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "gobby"
},
"server": {
"name": "gobby"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (96 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([get_usage_report]) and tools that can send data out ([can_spawn_agent, evaluate_spawn, send_message]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_usage_report → can_spawn_agent"
},
"evidence": "sources [get_usage_report] → sinks [can_spawn_agent, evaluate_spawn, send_message]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"get_usage_report"
],
"sinks": [
"can_spawn_agent",
"evaluate_spawn",
"send_message"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"can_spawn_agent\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"can_spawn_agent\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "can_spawn_agent"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"evaluate_spawn\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"evaluate_spawn\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "evaluate_spawn"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build_backend/__init__.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build_backend/__init__.py:108`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build_backend/__init__.py"
},
"evidence": ") result = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 B607 command, cwd=_WEB_SRC, ch",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build_backend/__init__.py",
"line": 108,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/adapters/codex_impl/client.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/adapters/codex_impl/client.py:154`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/adapters/codex_impl/client.py"
},
"evidence": "self._process = subprocess.Popen( # nosec B603 # hardcoded argument list command,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/adapters/codex_impl/client.py",
"line": 154,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/checkpoint_manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/checkpoint_manager.py:140`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/checkpoint_manager.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], cwd=cwd, capture",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/checkpoint_manager.py",
"line": 140,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/isolation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/isolation.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/isolation.py"
},
"evidence": "r) -> str: result = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 B607 # fixed git argv on local isolation path. [\"git\", \"-C",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/isolation.py",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/sandbox.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/sandbox.py:508`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/sandbox.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [ \"git\", \"-C\", str(w",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/sandbox.py",
"line": 508,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/spawn_executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/spawn_executor.py:295`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/spawn_executor.py"
},
"evidence": "in terminal with direct spawn (no preflight). Session linkage approach: 1. Pre-create Gobby session with parent",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/spawn_executor.py",
"line": 295,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/spawners/base.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/spawners/base.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/spawners/base.py"
},
"evidence": "@abstractmethod def spawn( self, command: list[str], cwd: str | Path, env: dict[str,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/spawners/base.py",
"line": 85,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/tmux/session_manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/tmux/session_manager.py:152`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/tmux/session_manager.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run( [\"wsl\", \"--exec\", \"which\", self._config.command],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/tmux/session_manager.py",
"line": 152,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/agents/tmux/spawner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/agents/tmux/spawner.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/agents/tmux/spawner.py"
},
"evidence": "is_available() def spawn( self, command: list[str], cwd: str | Path, env: dict[str,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/agents/tmux/spawner.py",
"line": 85,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/gobby/build/branch_cleanup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/build/branch_cleanup.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/build/branch_cleanup.py"
},
"evidence": "rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( # nosec B603 # git args are fixed by callers. [\"git\", *args], c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/gobby/build/branch_cleanup.py",
"line": 134,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"unlink_identity\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_identity\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_identity"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/gobby/cli/installers/shared.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/gobby/cli/installers/shared.py:256`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/gobby/cli/installers/shared.py"
},
"evidence": "y: module = __import__(module_path, fromlist=[func_name]) sync_fn = getattr(module, func_name)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/gobby/cli/installers/shared.py",
"line": 256,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"can_spawn_agent\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"can_spawn_agent\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "can_spawn_agent"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"evaluate_spawn\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"evaluate_spawn\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "evaluate_spawn"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"unlink_identity\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_identity\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_identity"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"gobby\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "gobby"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_usage_report"
],
"externalSink": [
"can_spawn_agent",
"evaluate_spawn",
"send_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_usage_report",
"can_spawn_agent"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: get_usage_report → can_spawn_agent."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_mcp_servers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tool_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "call_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recommend_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_mcp_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_mcp_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_mcp_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "init_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agent_runs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "can_spawn_agent",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"spawn\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_running_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "running_agent_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evaluate_spawn",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"spawn\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "render_surface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_surface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_canvas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait_for_interaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "canvas_present",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_identities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlink_identity",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "set_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_config_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ensure_defaults",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_cron_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_cron_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cron_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_cron_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "toggle_cron_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_cron_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_cron_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_cron_runs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_machine_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_cross_project_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_cross_project_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hub_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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