Gmail (npm) MCP Server

gmail-mcp-server npm v1.0.30

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Gmail MCP Server with on-demand authentication for SIYA/Claude Desktop. Complete Gmail integration with multi-user support and OAuth2 security.

View on npm ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

91/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 91/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 99 − adoption risk = 91/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−1.2	Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010	supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2	publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import readline from 'readline'; import os from 'os'; // D

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/cli.js

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([gmail_read_email, gmail_get_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([gmail_send_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [gmail_read_email, gmail_get_attachment] → sinks [gmail_send_email]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow gmail_read_email → gmail_send_email

low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"gmail-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.

Evidence: node install.js

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package gmail-mcp-server

Tools 16

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

gmail_get_attachmentingests untrusted input
gmail_read_emailingests untrusted input
gmail_send_emailnetwork egress
analyze_conversationno sensitive capability
gmail_authenticateno sensitive capability
gmail_authenticate_userno sensitive capability
gmail_delete_emailno sensitive capability
gmail_draftno sensitive capability
gmail_list_attachmentsno sensitive capability
gmail_logoutno sensitive capability

Show 6 more tools ↓

gmail_manage_sessionno sensitive capability
gmail_mark_emailno sensitive capability
gmail_move_emailno sensitive capability
gmail_performance_metricsno sensitive capability
gmail_search_emailsno sensitive capability
gmail_system_statusno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v1.0.30` latest	A 91/100	3	1.13.0	2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/gmail-mcp-server/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/gmail-mcp-server)

HTML

<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/gmail-mcp-server"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/gmail-mcp-server/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>

Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/gmail-mcp-server/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan gmail-mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Gmail 26

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 27 side by side →

Gmail (klodr) Source verified npm

@klodr/gmail-mcp

Gmail MCP server — scope-gated tools + attachment/download path jails + supply-chain hardening. Fork of GongRzhe/Gmail-MCP-Server via ArtyMcLabin's intermediate fork.

Communication & Collaboration Score 100/100 0 findings 306/wk Cap. Minimal

Gmail (artymclabin) npm

@artymclabin/gmail-mcp

Lean Gmail MCP server with auto authentication support (maintained fork of GongRzhe/Gmail-MCP-Server)

Communication & Collaboration Score 99/100 0 findings 398/wk Cap. Minimal

Gmail (franciscpd) npm

@franciscpd/gmail-mcp-server

MCP server for Gmail — read, search, send, reply, and manage emails via AI agents

Communication & Collaboration Score 99/100 0 findings 87/wk Cap. Minimal

Gmail (striderlabs) npm

@striderlabs/mcp-gmail

MCP server for Gmail - let AI agents send, read, and search email