gmail-calendar-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Multi-account Gmail + Google Calendar MCP server (stdio) with env-var-only OAuth credentials.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Untrusted-input tools ([download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, forward_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_attachment] → sinks [send_email, forward_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_attachment → send_email
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputforward_messagenetwork egresssend_emailnetwork egressarchiveno sensitive capabilitybatch_modify_messagesno sensitive capabilitybatch_trashno sensitive capabilitybatch_untrashno sensitive capabilityclear_calendarno sensitive capabilitycreate_calendarno sensitive capabilitycreate_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_filterno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_calendarno sensitive capabilitydelete_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_filterno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilityget_calendarno sensitive capabilityget_colorsno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_freebusyno sensitive capabilityget_messageno sensitive capabilityget_message_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_settingno sensitive capabilityget_signatureno sensitive capabilityget_threadno sensitive capabilityget_vacation_responderno sensitive capabilityimport_eventno sensitive capabilitylabel_messageno sensitive capabilitylabel_threadno sensitive capabilitylist_aclno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_draftsno sensitive capabilitylist_event_instancesno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_filtersno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_settingsno sensitive capabilitymark_importantno sensitive capabilitymark_not_importantno sensitive capabilitymark_readno sensitive capabilitymark_unreadno sensitive capabilitymove_eventno sensitive capabilitymove_to_inboxno sensitive capabilityquick_add_eventno sensitive capabilityreply_to_messageno sensitive capabilityrespond_to_eventno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capabilitysearch_threadsno sensitive capabilitysend_draftno sensitive capabilityset_vacation_responderno sensitive capabilityshare_calendarno sensitive capabilitystarno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_calendarno sensitive capabilitytrash_messageno sensitive capabilitytrash_threadno sensitive capabilityunlabel_messageno sensitive capabilityunlabel_threadno sensitive capabilityunshare_calendarno sensitive capabilityunstarno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_calendarno sensitive capabilityuntrash_messageno sensitive capabilityuntrash_threadno sensitive capabilityupdate_aclno sensitive capabilityupdate_calendarno sensitive capabilityupdate_calendar_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityupdate_draftno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_signatureno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gmail-calendar-mcp --online --registry pypi
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