Gmail Calendar MCP Server

gmail-calendar-mcp PyPI v0.2.0

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Multi-account Gmail + Google Calendar MCP server (stdio) with env-var-only OAuth credentials.

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, forward_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_attachment] → sinks [send_email, forward_message]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_attachment → send_email

Tools 72

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • download_attachmentingests untrusted input
  • forward_messagenetwork egress
  • send_emailnetwork egress
  • archiveno sensitive capability
  • batch_modify_messagesno sensitive capability
  • batch_trashno sensitive capability
  • batch_untrashno sensitive capability
  • clear_calendarno sensitive capability
  • create_calendarno sensitive capability
  • create_draftno sensitive capability
Show 62 more tools ↓
  • create_eventno sensitive capability
  • create_filterno sensitive capability
  • create_labelno sensitive capability
  • delete_calendarno sensitive capability
  • delete_draftno sensitive capability
  • delete_eventno sensitive capability
  • delete_filterno sensitive capability
  • delete_labelno sensitive capability
  • get_calendarno sensitive capability
  • get_colorsno sensitive capability
  • get_eventno sensitive capability
  • get_freebusyno sensitive capability
  • get_messageno sensitive capability
  • get_message_attachmentsno sensitive capability
  • get_profileno sensitive capability
  • get_settingno sensitive capability
  • get_signatureno sensitive capability
  • get_threadno sensitive capability
  • get_vacation_responderno sensitive capability
  • import_eventno sensitive capability
  • label_messageno sensitive capability
  • label_threadno sensitive capability
  • list_aclno sensitive capability
  • list_calendarsno sensitive capability
  • list_draftsno sensitive capability
  • list_event_instancesno sensitive capability
  • list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_filtersno sensitive capability
  • list_labelsno sensitive capability
  • list_settingsno sensitive capability
  • mark_importantno sensitive capability
  • mark_not_importantno sensitive capability
  • mark_readno sensitive capability
  • mark_unreadno sensitive capability
  • move_eventno sensitive capability
  • move_to_inboxno sensitive capability
  • quick_add_eventno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_messageno sensitive capability
  • respond_to_eventno sensitive capability
  • search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • search_threadsno sensitive capability
  • send_draftno sensitive capability
  • set_vacation_responderno sensitive capability
  • share_calendarno sensitive capability
  • starno sensitive capability
  • subscribe_calendarno sensitive capability
  • trash_messageno sensitive capability
  • trash_threadno sensitive capability
  • unlabel_messageno sensitive capability
  • unlabel_threadno sensitive capability
  • unshare_calendarno sensitive capability
  • unstarno sensitive capability
  • unsubscribe_calendarno sensitive capability
  • untrash_messageno sensitive capability
  • untrash_threadno sensitive capability
  • update_aclno sensitive capability
  • update_calendarno sensitive capability
  • update_calendar_subscriptionno sensitive capability
  • update_draftno sensitive capability
  • update_eventno sensitive capability
  • update_labelno sensitive capability
  • update_signatureno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.0 latest A 95/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan gmail-calendar-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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