Gluecron — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "https://gluecron.com/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "http",
"origin": "https://gluecron.com/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "gluecron",
"version": "1.0"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-003",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "live",
"label": "inspection depth (live) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "live",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": false,
"packageMetadata": false,
"liveTransport": true
},
"caveats": []
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: gluecron_get_commit → gluecron_read_file ⇒ gluecron_create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "gluecron_get_commit → gluecron_read_file → gluecron_create_issue"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"gluecron_get_pr",
"gluecron_get_commit",
"gluecron_get_workflow_run",
"gluecron_get_workflow_logs"
],
"sources": [
"gluecron_repo_read_file",
"gluecron_read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"gluecron_create_issue",
"gluecron_merge_pr"
],
"path": [
"gluecron_get_commit",
"gluecron_read_file",
"gluecron_create_issue"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "gluecron_get_commit",
"to": "gluecron_read_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "gluecron_read_file",
"to": "gluecron_create_issue",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"gluecron_write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"gluecron_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-003",
"title": "Annotation contradicts behavior on \"gluecron_write_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_write_file\" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (file-write). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.",
"remediation": "Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_write_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"annotations": {
"title": "Write file",
"readOnlyHint": false,
"destructiveHint": false
}
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"gluecron_repo_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_repo_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_repo_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"gluecron_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"gluecron_write_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_write_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_write_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"gluecron_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gluecron_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gluecron_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-NET-005",
"title": "Remote HTTP MCP endpoint",
"category": "network",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Remote endpoint gluecron.com. MCP Trust Checker does not test server-side authentication/authorization; verify the endpoint requires auth.",
"location": {
"kind": "transport"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"gluecron_get_pr",
"gluecron_get_commit",
"gluecron_get_workflow_run",
"gluecron_get_workflow_logs"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"gluecron_repo_read_file",
"gluecron_read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"gluecron_create_issue",
"gluecron_merge_pr"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"gluecron_get_commit",
"gluecron_read_file",
"gluecron_create_issue"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: gluecron_get_commit → gluecron_read_file ⇒ gluecron_create_issue."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "gluecron_repo_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_repo_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_repo_list_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_repo_explain_codebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_repo_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_comment_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_close_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_reopen_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_create_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_pr",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_list_prs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_comment_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_merge_pr",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"open_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_close_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_fork_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_delete_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_update_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_search_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_clone_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_label_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_unlabel_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_assign_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_search_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_request_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_search_prs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_open_draft_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_generate_pr_description",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_write_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_list_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_commit",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_create_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_atomic_multi_file_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_ship_spec",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_voice_to_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_refactor_across_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_explain_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_chat_with_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_chat_continue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_generate_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_generate_commit_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_generate_release_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_propose_migration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_propose_doc_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_trigger_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_workflow_run",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_workflow_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_cancel_workflow_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_preview_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_provision_pr_sandbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_create_agent_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_acquire_lease",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_release_lease",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_get_agent_budget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_semantic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_find_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_pr_status_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_ai_cost_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gluecron_security_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3a4e17394d60e0bf30a136e1d6ba55005a0d9b217a4d89b4f08473717f69e32b",
"stats": {
"tools": 62,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 37,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 4,
"info": 1
}
}
}