Gitlab Mcp Agent MCP Server
gitlab-mcp-agent-server
npm
v0.2.13
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for GitLab integration via OAuth
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/infrastructure/auth/gitlab-oauth-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/infrastructure/auth/gitlab-oauth-manager.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: er = void 0; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto"); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/infrastructure/auth/gitlab-oauth-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/shared/config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/shared/config.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: enStorePath; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_os_1 = require("node:os"); const nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/shared/config.js
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gitlab_create_issuenetwork egressgitlab_apply_issue_transitionno sensitive capabilitygitlab_assign_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_close_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_ensure_labelsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_list_issuesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_list_labelsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_list_project_membersno sensitive capabilitygitlab_oauth_startno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
gitlab_oauth_statusno sensitive capabilitygitlab_reopen_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_resume_requestno sensitive capabilitygitlab_unassign_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_update_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_update_issue_labelsno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.13 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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