gitlab-api
PyPI
v26.4.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
GitLab API + MCP Server + A2A Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/security_sanitizer.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "ls-files", "--cached", "--others", "--exclude-standard"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/security_sanitizer.py
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_verify_agent.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "logs", container_name], capture_output=True, text=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_verify_agent.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
api_requestno sensitive capabilitygitlab_branchesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_commitsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_deploy_tokensno sensitive capabilitygitlab_discover_graphql_schemano sensitive capabilitygitlab_environmentsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_epicsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_graphqlno sensitive capabilitygitlab_graphql_opsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_groupsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_ingest_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_ingest_projectsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_instancesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_issuesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_jobsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_labelsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_membersno sensitive capabilitygitlab_merge_requestsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_merge_rulesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_milestonesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_namespacesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_notesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_packagesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_pipeline_schedulesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_projectsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_protected_branchesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_releasesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_runnersno sensitive capabilitygitlab_snippetsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_tagsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_usersno sensitive capabilitygitlab_vulnerabilitiesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_wikino sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v26.4.0 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gitlab-api --online --registry pypi
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