Github Project — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "github-project-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "github-project-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "github-project-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cli.py:101`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cli.py"
},
"evidence": "process subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, str(server_path)], en",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "cli.py",
"line": 101,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"create_issue_with_images\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_issue_with_images\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_issue_with_images",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_issue_with_images",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_repo_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_labels_to_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_labels_from_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_assignees_to_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_assignees_from_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_issue_to_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_issue_from_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_project_item_field",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_project_item_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_repository_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d23220371a9772422b66b40dbd7914c9fafda92931794e1970d36551a3a81508",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}