Github Mcp Connector MCP Server
github-mcp-connector
PyPI
v0.15.0
Published by winnerlose2026 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_artifact → get_file_contents → create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_artifact → get_file_contents → create_issue
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 122
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_issuenetwork egresscreate_issues_for_alertsnetwork egresscreate_pull_requestnetwork egressdelete_filewrites filesdownload_artifactingests untrusted inputdownload_release_assetingests untrusted inputget_branch_protectioningests untrusted inputget_file_contentsreads sensitive dataget_secret_scanning_alertreads sensitive datalist_run_artifactsingests untrusted input
Show 112 more tools ↓
add_assigneesno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_labelsno sensitive capabilityadd_pull_request_review_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_repository_collaboratorno sensitive capabilitycancel_workflow_runno sensitive capabilitycompare_commitsno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_commit_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_gistno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycreate_or_update_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_releaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_repositoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_scheduled_workflowno sensitive capabilitydelete_branchno sensitive capabilitydelete_gistno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_releaseno sensitive capabilitydelete_release_and_tagno sensitive capabilitydelete_release_assetno sensitive capabilitydelete_repo_secretno sensitive capabilitydelete_repo_variableno sensitive capabilitydelete_tagno sensitive capabilitydismiss_code_scanning_alertno sensitive capabilitydismiss_dependabot_alertno sensitive capabilityfind_reusable_repositoriesno sensitive capabilityfork_repositoryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_release_notesno sensitive capabilityget_authenticated_userno sensitive capabilityget_code_scanning_alertno sensitive capabilityget_combined_statusno sensitive capabilityget_commitno sensitive capabilityget_dependabot_alertno sensitive capabilityget_gistno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_job_logsno sensitive capabilityget_latest_releaseno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_diffno sensitive capabilityget_rate_limitno sensitive capabilityget_release_by_tagno sensitive capabilityget_repositoryno sensitive capabilityget_repository_topicsno sensitive capabilityget_repository_treeno sensitive capabilityget_tagno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_check_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_code_scanning_alertsno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_dependabot_alertsno sensitive capabilitylist_gistsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_my_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_notificationsno sensitive capabilitylist_pending_deploymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_review_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_reviewsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_release_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_releasesno sensitive capabilitylist_repo_secretsno sensitive capabilitylist_repo_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_repository_collaboratorsno sensitive capabilitylist_repository_languagesno sensitive capabilitylist_secret_scanning_alertsno sensitive capabilitylist_security_alertsno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflow_run_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflow_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflowsno sensitive capabilitylock_issueno sensitive capabilitymark_all_notifications_readno sensitive capabilitymark_notification_readno sensitive capabilitymerge_branchno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_labelno sensitive capabilityremove_repository_collaboratorno sensitive capabilityreplace_repository_topicsno sensitive capabilityrequest_pull_request_reviewersno sensitive capabilityrerun_workflow_runno sensitive capabilityresolve_secret_scanning_alertno sensitive capabilityreview_deploymentno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_commitsno sensitive capabilitysearch_issuesno sensitive capabilitysearch_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitysearch_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilityset_repo_secretno sensitive capabilityset_repo_variableno sensitive capabilitysubmit_pull_request_reviewno sensitive capabilitytrigger_workflowno sensitive capabilityunlock_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_branch_protectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_gistno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_request_branchno sensitive capabilityupdate_releaseno sensitive capabilityupdate_repositoryno sensitive capabilityupload_release_assetno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (122 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.15.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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